The Gravitational Force of Federal Law by Dodson, Scott
 
(703) 
ARTICLE 
THE GRAVITATIONAL FORCE OF FEDERAL LAW 
SCOTT DODSON† 
In the American system of dual sovereignty, states have primary authority over 
matters of state law. In nonpreemptive areas in which state and federal regimes are 
parallel—such as matters of court procedure, certain statutory law, and even some 
constitutional law—states have full authority to legislate and interpret state law in 
ways that diverge from analogous federal law. But, in large measure, they do not. It 
is as if federal law exerts a gravitational force that draws states to mimic federal law 
even when federal law does not require state conformity. This Article explores the 
widespread phenomenon of federal law’s gravitational pull. The Article begins by 
identifying the existence of a gravitational force throughout a range of procedural and 
substantive law felt by a host of state actors, including state rulemakers, legislators, 
judges, and even the people themselves. It then excavates some explanatory vectors to 
help understand and appreciate why federal law exerts a gravitational force. Finally, 
the Article considers some normative concerns with state acquiescence to the federal 
gravitational pull. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Federalism promotes state autonomy in the development of legal norms, 
both as a matter of sovereignty and as a matter of experimentation. For the 
most part, states as sovereigns are entitled to design, implement, and interpret 
their respective state laws as they see fit. Their independence inures to the 
benefit of the whole, for state laws can be constructed to fit their particular 
local cultures, and the resulting diversity can offer opportunities for innovation 
and experimentation without damaging the whole. 
Perhaps no one in the early modern era more forcefully pressed this vision 
of state autonomy than Justice Louis Brandeis. In a 1932 dissent challenging 
the Lochner-era Court’s propensity to invalidate state laws on federal constitutional 
grounds, Brandeis famously wrote, “It is one of the happy incidents of the 
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve 
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk 
to the rest of the country.”1 The premise was that states wanted to innovate. 
States wanted to exercise their sovereign independence, but the Supreme 
Court would not let them. 
Six years later, Brandeis penned the even more famous opinion in Erie 
Railroad v. Tompkins, which prohibited federal courts from developing common 
law in diversity cases.2 Erie overruled a previous case, Swift v. Tyson, which 
had allowed federal courts to develop their own substantive federal common 
 
1 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
2 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938). 
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law. Swift was premised in part on the idea that state courts would follow 
federal law on common-law matters, and that states would follow federal 
common-law development not as a matter of command but as a matter of 
judgment.3 In Erie, Brandeis decreed that history had repudiated that premise: 
state courts refused to be followers.4 And he confirmed the sovereign prerogative 
of independent state lawmaking in a federalist system.5 
In light of Brandeis’s powerful vision—oft-repeated by scholars and 
courts—one might expect the states to take full advantage of their lawmaking 
independence to forge legal norms and regimes that reflect the whims and 
prejudices of their own citizenries, even when those norms and regimes differ 
profoundly from those of the nation as a whole.6 But in fact, since Erie, states 
have routinely followed federal law even when adherence is not compelled. 
Rather than blaze their own paths, states tend to look to federal law as their 
starting points. It is as if federal law exerts a kind of gravitational pull on 
states. This gravitational pull expands beyond courts—to legislatures, rulemakers, 
and even the people themselves. 
The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, of course, makes some state 
following of federal law mandatory.7 But I mean to focus on following of a 
different nature, one that derives not from legal compulsion but rather from 
allurement. This kind of state following persists in a host of areas traversing 
both procedural and substantive law. In each area, states often follow federal 
law for woefully inadequate reasons, and sometimes for no reason at all. 
To be sure, federal lawmaking and interpretation may reflect a common 
policy shared by states, such that states mirror federal pronouncements because 
both sovereigns share similar policy goals. But there is evidence that much 
state parallelism is not independent. As this Article documents, states follow 
even abrupt and counterintuitive changes in federal law. If the Pied Piper 
heads out of town in the direction of a candy store, it may be difficult to tell 
 
3 See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842) (holding that federal courts do not need 
to follow state court common law in issues of general commercial law because court decisions are 
“only evidence of what the laws are; and are not of themselves law”). 
4 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74 (“Persistence of state courts in their own opinions on questions of 
common law prevented uniformity . . . .”). 
5 See id. at 78-79 (explaining that “Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of 
common law applicable in a State” and that interference in the judicial and legislative affairs of the 
state is an infringement of a state’s independence). 
6 Even today, commentators advocate for limited national power on the assumption that states 
will fill the space with innovation, and that expansive national power stifles innovation. See, e.g., 
Myron T. Steele & Peter I. Tsoflias, Realigning the Constitutional Pendulum, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1365, 
1369-70 (2013/2014) (emphasizing that the importance of federalism lies in the ability of states to 
implement policy on a gradual and piecemeal level, which allows for feedback and improved 
institutional learning). 
7 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (establishing the supremacy of the Constitution and the “Laws 
of the United States”). 
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whether the children are being lured by the music or the sweets. But if the 
Piper abruptly turns ninety degrees and the children still follow, then the 
parents would be convinced that it was the music. Examples of such state 
following abound. 
This Article’s central thesis is that something more than independent 
parallel conduct is afoot: federal law exerts a widespread gravitational pull on 
state actors.8 To be sure, the pull of federal law is not inexorable. State actors can 
and do resist and diverge from federal law. But these counterexamples are 
also a part of the story. Perhaps paradoxically, they help prove that the 
gravitational force exists, and they offer clues as to why it has such pull. 
In Part I, I defend the descriptive claim that federal law’s gravitational force 
affects a wide array of state actors (including state rulemakers, legislators, and 
courts) across various areas of nonpreemptive law (procedural rules, substantive 
statutes, and constitutional provisions). In these areas, state actors have 
authority to craft regimes and render interpretations different from—even 
contrary to—federal law, and one might expect states to exercise this authority 
with some frequency. But, in significant measure, they instead follow federal law. 
Even when they resist the impulse to follow, they muster tremendous effort to 
do so. Federal law is a Piper’s song that captivates the states. 
Part II theorizes explanations for the gravitational force of federal law and 
for states’ tendencies to follow. Mimicking federal law may offer a relatively 
safe way to ease the cognitive, systemic, and resource pressures of independently 
developing and maintaining a workable legal system. Or perhaps intrastate 
vertical uniformity is of overriding importance. State actors might be more 
familiar with federal law than state law. Or elected state actors could believe 
federal law offers political cover for their enactments or decisions. And following 
begets more following, resulting in a habit that supplies its own compulsion. 
Part III then considers the normativity of the gravitational force of federal 
law and stakes out some of its vices. Following comes at the expense of the 
salutary benefits of variation and experimentation. Following can distort state 
law in ways that cause state law to misalign with, and potentially undermine, 
the policies and preferences of the state electorate. By appearing to be a 
shortcut, following can mar the reputation of states as coequal sovereigns in a 
federalist system. And, perhaps most troubling, following can induce cyclical 
entrenchment of the very causes of following in the first place. 
 
8 Others have used this or a related term in off-hand and narrower ways. See, e.g., Glenn S. 
Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil 
Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1186 (2005) (noting 
“the decreasing gravitational pull of the Federal Rules on the states”). However, I am the first to 
explore the concept systematically across various doctrines and legal actors. 
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I conclude with calls to action. I entreat states to seize their own 
empowerment and tackle state law with the attention to state interests that it 
deserves. At the same time, I urge federal actors to conduct their business 
with sensitivity to its shadow effect on states. I also seek others to join in a 
sociological and empirical effort to study and understand better the 
gravitational force of federal law. 
I.  FEDERAL GRAVITY 
In this Part, I stake out the descriptive claim that federal law exerts a 
gravitational pull on state actors. To defend the claim, I consider a number of 
examples of procedural and substantive law, and I study relationships among 
courts, rulemakers, and legislators. 
A.  Procedure 
In the post-1938 world, federal and state courts independently develop 
and apply their own procedures. Except in very limited contexts, forum 
procedure controls: federal procedure applies in federal courts, and state 
procedure applies in state courts.9 Thus, states are free to adopt their own 
rules of procedure, and state courts are free to interpret their state rules 
independently of federal rules and federal judicial opinions.10 Consequently, 
consideration of procedural rules presents an opportunity to study the 
gravitational effect of federal law on both state rulemakers and state courts. 
1.  State Rulemakers 
Before 1938, states had a long history of innovation and self-reliance in 
designing civil procedure. States had been doing so independently since the 
Revolutionary Era, and although they engaged in borrowing from English 
traditions and from sister states, they generally exhibited the willingness and 
freedom to develop the particular procedure that best fit their needs, even if 
that independence caused significant disuniformity among states. Conversely, 
federal procedure was largely derivative. The Process and Conformity Acts 
required federal courts to apply the applicable state court rules of procedure 
 
9 See Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 48 (2006) (noting that in 
our federal system an initial question is whether federal or state law applies—a question with a 
relatively clear answer in most cases). 
10 See Scott Dodson, A Closer Look at New Pleading in the Litigation Marketplace, JUDICATURE, 
Aug. 2015, at 11, 17 (noting that state courts are within their rights to reject the new federal pleading 
standards set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), because federal court 
interpretations of federal laws do not legally affect state procedural rules). 
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in the state in which they sat, effectively directing federal courts to follow 
state rules.11 
In 1822, the Supreme Court adopted the Federal Equity Rules, derived 
from English equity tradition, to provide uniform equity procedure in federal 
courts.12 Yet the states continued to exercise procedural independence in 
equity. Many states avoided the Federal Equity Rules and instead adopted 
New York’s Field Code, which merged law and equity.13 In both law and 
equity, states readily asserted their independence, divergence, and even 
leadership in matters of procedure. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938, ushered in a new 
era of federal procedural uniformity. Federal interstate uniformity made some 
sense, but the revolutionary procedural changes made by the Federal Rules 
seemed a poor model for states. The Rules were modeled on principles of 
equity, a dramatic historical change that most states had already rejected in 
favor of procedural regimes built on principles of the common law.14 Meanwhile, 
the state benches and bars of the 1930s were highly provincial. Senator 
Thomas Walsh of Montana argued that the new Federal Rules, which he 
believed were designed for complex cases likely to be pursued in urban 
centers, would create tension with the code practice that worked well in many 
states.15 He repeatedly admonished that the national legal community was 
 
11 See Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (declaring that “practice, pleadings, 
and forms and modes of proceeding” in federal district and circuit courts should conform “as near as 
may be” with the procedures of state court); Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (providing 
that “the forms of writs, executions, and other process” shall be the same in federal courts as those 
used in state court); Federal Judicial Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94 (declaring the forms 
of writs and executions in federal court be the same as the processes of the supreme court of the 
state where the federal court sits). For a history of the numerous statutes directing federal courts to 
apply state procedure, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1015, 1036-42 (1982) (describing the problems with and dissatisfaction over attempts to standardize 
federal and state procedural law through statutes like the Conformity Act of 1872). 
12 See JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES, at x-xii (Byron F. Babbitt 
ed., 8th ed. 1933) (providing an updated version of Federal Equity Rules that first went into effect 
in 1822). The Federal Equity Rules looked to English tradition rather than the states because state 
equity procedure was sparse and varied. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common 
Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 931 (1987) 
(explaining the underdevelopment of equity in the states, which led to the application of historic 
equity law and effectively disengaged law and equity as companion systems in the federal courts). 
13 See Subrin, supra note 12, at 932-33, 939 (stating that half of the states adopted the New York 
Field Code instead of the Federal Equity Rules). 
14 See id. at 922, 926 (“The underlying philosophy of, and procedural choices embodied in the 
Federal Rules were almost universally drawn from equity rather than common law . . . . Until the 
twentieth century, however, the predominant mode of procedural thought, reinvigorated by Field 
and his Code, was still common law based.”). 
15 See id. at 996 (“Walsh’s opposition was normally characterized by his unwillingness to force 
lawyers, particularly the ‘small practitioner and the country lawyer,’ to learn federal procedure that 
is different from the procedural rules of their homes states, accompanied by his fear that the simple 
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an amalgam of different local legal practices and cultures that should not be 
forcibly unified.16 
Given the longstanding history of common law procedure in the states, 
the states’ tradition in procedural independence, and the recognition that 
differing legal cultures demanded different procedural regimes, one might have 
expected states to greet the Federal Rules with indifference, or, at most, with 
curiosity tempered by independence. Yet, within a generation, most state 
legislatures and rulemakers substantially adopted the Federal Rules as a model 
for their own reforms. In 1960, Charles Wright surveyed state procedures and 
found a trend toward adoption of the federal rules.17 John Oakley and Arthur 
Coon, conducting an important follow-up study in 1986, found that twenty-
three state procedural regimes mirrored the federal rules to such a high degree 
as to be categorized as “replica” states.18 Ten more were so similar to the Federal 
 
code procedure of Western states would be somehow prejudiced by the complex procedure used in 
metropolitan areas, such as New York.”). 
16 See Burbank, supra note 11, at 1063-65, 1092 (discussing Walsh’s concern that a uniform federal 
procedure would cause inconvenience and interpretive problems); Subrin, supra note 12, at 956 n.276, 
998 (describing Walsh’s argument that a large country whose regions had different customs and 
needs should not have uniform rules). Some drafters of the Federal Rules publicly predicted that 
states would adopt “mini-FRCPs” so as to create both interstate and intrastate uniformity. It is 
unclear, however, whether these were sincere beliefs or whether these were overly optimistic political 
rejoinders to those who, like Thomas Walsh, opposed the Federal Rules on grounds of intrastate 
disuniformity. See Koppel, supra note 8, at 1179 (describing the drafters’ goal to provide uniform 
federal and state procedure); Stephen N. Subrin, A New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A. J. 
1648, 1650 (1981) (presenting Walsh’s argument that “the price of this interfederal court uniformity 
was the loss of intrastate uniformity”); see also Thomas Wall Shelton, A New Era of Judicial Relations, 
23 CASE & COMMENT 388, 393 (1916) (“[A] simple, scientific, correlated system of rules, such as 
would be prepared and promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States, would prove a 
model that would, for reasons of convenience as well as of principle, be adopted by the states.”). 
Interestingly, many prominent reformers’ states—including New York (William Mitchell and the 
ABA), Connecticut (Charles Clark), and Nebraska (Roscoe Pound)—adhered predominantly to the 
old code-based procedural system. See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State 
Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1378 (1986) 
(classifying six states as those “which have neither notice pleading nor a rules-based procedural 
system in common with the Federal Rules”). 
17 1 WILLIAM W. BARRON & ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE §§ 9.1–.53, at 46-80 (Charles Alan Wright ed., 1960). 
18 Oakley & Coon, supra note 16, at 1377 (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, District of 
Columbia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West 
Virginia, Wyoming). Idaho, Mississippi, and Nevada, which also had notice pleading, and Arkansas, 
Delaware, and South Carolina, which had fact pleading, were considered to have modeled their 
regimes on the Federal Rules. Id. at 1377-78. Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin had adopted the notice 
pleading of the Federal Rules but otherwise had “[i]diosyncratic [r]ules-[b]ased [p]rocedural 
system[s]”; New Hampshire had notice pleading but otherwise an “[i]diosyncratic [p]rocedural 
[s]ystem”; Georgia, Kansas,  North Carolina, and Oklahoma had notice pleading but a “[f]ederal 
[c]ode [p]rocedural [s]ystem”; Florida, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Texas, and Virginia had fact pleading and idiosyncratic rules-based procedural systems; and 
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Rules as to be considered “substantially conforming” systems.19 Indeed, Oakley 
and Coon concluded that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure exerted a 
“pervasive nationwide influence . . . in that [by 1977] all states had adopted 
federal procedure to some degree.”20 Oakley and Coon were not alone in this 
observation; Charles Alan Wright and Mary Kay Kane noted, “[T]here is not 
a jurisdiction that has not revised its procedure in some way that reflects the 
influence of the federal rules.”21 
Oakley and Coon were surprised by their findings, but not in the way one 
might expect. They were shocked that only twenty-three states were substantial 
conformists.22 Thus, Oakley and Coon meant to tell a story of state resistance, 
a story that Oakley continued in a follow-up study in 2002.23 
Of course, states can—and sometimes do—blaze their own trails,24 and 
Oakley and Coon reveal intriguing instances of state divergence.25 I explore 
this divergence in more detail in Part II. But Oakley and Coon’s study also 
tells an important and overlooked story about the gravitational pull of the 
Federal Rules on state lawmakers. Despite historical, procedural, and cultural 
reasons for states to react to the Federal Rules with diffidence, the adoption of 
the Federal Rules wrenched the states off their traditional courses. Most states’ 
rules now mirror the Federal Rules, and the rest have been pulled toward the 
Federal Rules in significant ways. In every state, federal rulemakers have exerted 
an extraordinary gravitational pull on state rulemakers. 
 
California, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, and New York had fact pleading and code-
based procedural systems. Id. 
19 See John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 358 (2002). 
20 Oakley & Coon, supra note 16, at 1371 (emphasis added); see also Thomas O. Main, Procedural 
Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States that Have 
Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 326-29 (2001) (finding summary 
judgment rules and discovery practices to be remarkably similar to the federal rules in Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, and Nebraska—states found by Oakley and Coon to have procedural systems least 
influenced by the federal model). 
21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 431 (7th ed. 2011). 
22 Oakley & Coon, supra note 16, at 1369. 
23 See Oakley, supra note 19, at 355 (finding “a general disinclination of states to conform to the 
ever-changing contours of the FRCP”). 
24 For example, Arizona, until recently a die-hard “replica” state, adopted unique discovery 
rules. See Koppel, supra note 8, at 1173 (noting that Arizona “took off on its own discovery reform 
trip, adopting a package of discovery reforms more aggressive than anything the federal rules have 
implemented”). And, sometimes, these state innovations are followed by federal rulemakers and 
courts. See id. at 1212 (explaining that following Arizona’s dramatic discovery reforms, the federal 
courts created similar discovery rules); see also Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and 
State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2040-42 
(1989) (identifying limitations on discovery practice as one example of state innovations that sparked 
federal rule revision). But federal following is rarer than state following. 
25 See Oakley & Coon, supra note 16, at 1426 (finding that the states with the highest levels of 
divergence tended to be the largest and most populous states); see also Oakley, supra note 19, at 383 
(demonstrating that state rulemakers today are less likely to follow federal rule amendments). 
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2.  State Courts 
State rulemakers following federal rules is not the only procedural story. 
The federal gravitational pull also affects courts. I explore those effects in two 
contexts: state rules patterned after federal rules, and state rules that deviate 
from federal rules. 
a. State Rules Patterned After Federal Rules 
State courts often follow federal courts when the applicable state rule mirrors 
the federal rule. To some degree, this kind of following should be expected. 
After all, the gravitational pull of the federal rule had its primary effect on the 
state rulemakers at the rulemaking stage. That pull brought the state rule so 
close to the federal rule that interpretations of each are likely to be similar. 
But even here, the gravitational pull has an additional effect on state courts. 
Although rules may be textually similar, a federal court interpretation of the 
federal rule is not preemptive of the state rule or binding on state courts 
interpreting the analogous state rule. And while state rulemakers may have 
intended that state rules be interpreted in light of then-existing federal 
precedent, it is far more tenuous to infer that the state rulemakers intended for 
post-adoption federal precedent to be indicative of the state rule’s meaning. 
Indeed, there are good reasons why state courts should not follow federal 
courts on certain issues. Federal dockets have different cases and different 
caseloads. Federal judges have life tenure and are less sensitive to local pressures. 
State judges are under greater docket congestion and resource pressures than 
federal judges.26 Different sets of attorneys appear in the different courts. These 
differences may suggest that a state rule should be interpreted in light of particular 
state contexts and norms, even if that results in an interpretation that diverges 
from the interpretation given in an identically worded federal rule. 
Yet the typical state court in this scenario tends to treat a federal appellate 
opinion as presumptively controlling, or at least as highly persuasive 
authority, without regard to any state policy reason for adherence or divergence. 
As Oakley and Coon found, a substantial number of state courts reiterate that 
they give, ipso facto, great weight to federal court interpretations of analogous 
federal rules.27 For example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court recently stated: 
“[W]here the Federal rule and our state rule are substantially similar, we will 
 
26 See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 563 
n.123 (explaining that the borrowing of the Federal Rules by state courts “is especially problematic to the 
extent that state court judges are under greater docket and resource pressures than their federal colleagues, 
depriving them of the ability to use the tools in the Federal Rules for managing litigation”). 
27 Oakley & Coon, supra note 16, at 1381-424 (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, D.C., 
Hawaii, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming). 
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look to the Federal courts for guidance or interpretation of our own rule.”28 
Revealingly, state courts rarely look to sister states’ interpretations of analogous 
state rules; rather, their eyes are raised upward, looking to the federal system. 
Pleading standards present a useful illustration. Rule 8 of the Federal 
Rules, which states that a claimant need set out only “a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”29 was designed to 
liberalize pleading away from the old code-pleading standard requiring that 
the allegation of facts state a cause of action.30 The new pleading standard 
was so revolutionary that lower federal courts resisted the new standard, often 
reverting back to code pleading in practice.31 
In 1957, the Supreme Court put the debate to rest (at least for a time) in 
Conley v. Gibson, holding that Rule 8 was a strongly liberalizing force and 
directing lower courts to abide by it.32 Conley interpreted Rule 8 to require only 
“a short and plain statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice 
of what the plaintiff ’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”33 Conley 
also glossed Rule 12(b)(6)—the rule allowing dismissal for “failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted”34—with the following interpretation: 
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the 
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state 
a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set 
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.35 
States also have pleading rules, but Conley interpreted only Federal Rule 8. 
Further, it is not obvious that Rules 8 and 12 mean what Conley said they did.36 
 
28 Hall v. Kuzenka, 843 A.2d 474, 476 (R.I. 2004); see also, Am. Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Burns, 
81 So.3d 320, 325 n.5 (Ala. 2011) (“As we have often stated, we look to the federal courts’ interpretation 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when those rules are similar to our own.”). 
29 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
30 See SCOTT DODSON, NEW PLEADING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: SLAMMING 
THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOORS? 19-23 (2013) (explaining that Rule 8 was intended to change 
the requirements of a complaint so that it had to recount only “the general nature of the cases and 
the circumstances or events upon which it is based . . . but not of details which he should ascertain 
for himself in preparing his defense”). 
31 See id. at 23-26 (discussing opposition to the changes to Rule 8 and how “opposition to the 
liberality of discovery and pleadings surged”). 
32 355 U.S. 41, 44-48 (1957). Many courts adhered to the liberal Conley standard in name only. 
See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 433, 448-50, 492 (1986) (providing specific examples of post-Conley courts 
dismissing complaints for lack of specificity and asserting that “the new fact pleading is more 
restrictive” than intended). 
33 Id. at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
34 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
35 Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. 
36 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1685 
(1998) (“Conley v. Gibson turned Rule 8 on its head . . . .”). 
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States with their own pleading rules patterned after Federal Rules 8 and 12, 
even with identical language, could reasonably have construed their rules 
differently, especially given the different docket loads and pressures facing 
state courts. Yet the states with replica rules universally adopted the Conley 
construction for their own pleading rules.37 They heard the Piper’s call, lined 
up, and followed for fifty years. 
In 2007, the Supreme Court abruptly changed course. In the pair of 
decisions Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly38 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,39 the Court 
embraced a different normative model for pleading (one of restriction rather 
than access),40 imposed two new pleading requirements (plausibility and 
nonconclusoriness),41 and abrogated Conley’s famous “no set of facts” standard.42 
Importantly, the Court based its decisions in part on policy matters largely 
confined to federal courts: the perceived increase in the cost of discovery under 
the federal discovery rules, and the perceived inability of federal judges to 
control that cost.43 Federal courts quickly got the memo after Iqbal and began 
applying the new pleading standard relentlessly, as required.44 But the Supreme 
Court’s new interpretation does not control state courts, which are free to 
interpret their rules independent of federal interpretation. What, then, would 
state courts do with this dramatic turn in federal pleading law? 
One might think that a state court, empowered as a truly independent 
system interpreting its own sovereign’s laws, would react to Twombly and Iqbal 
with some indifference. Notions of stare decisis, state rulemaking history, state 
policies, state practice, other state rules, and state institutional concerns should 
 
37 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 578 & n.5 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(describing how twenty-six states and the District of Columbia “[t]ak[e] their cues from the federal 
court[]” and utilize the Conley formulation as their standard for dismissal of a complaint). 
38 Id. (majority opinion). 
39 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
40 See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 
368 (2010) (“The Supreme Court’s capitulation to defendant requests for more stringent pleading 
standards [in Twombly and Iqbal] is the clearest evidence of procedure’s tilt towards restrictiveness.”). 
41 See DODSON, supra note 30, at 76 (explaining what the author calls “Iqbal Step One [where] 
a court should disregard all conclusory allegations” and “Iqbal Step Two [where] the court assesses 
the remaining well-pleaded factual allegations and their inferences to determine whether, in the 
judge’s experience and common sense, the facts plausibly state entitlement to relief”). 
42 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63 (holding that the “‘no set of facts’ language has been questioned, 
criticized, and explained away long enough . . . . [It] is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative 
gloss on an accepted pleading standard”). 
43 See id. at 559 (“[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to 
settle even anemic cases . . . . Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that 
reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of 
discovery in cases with no ‘reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant 
evidence’ to support a § 1 claim.”); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (warning that Rule 8 “does not 
unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
44 See DODSON, supra note 30, at 80. 
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be far more relevant. Absent some state-specific reason for changing course, 
Twombly and Iqbal, nonpreemptive decisions based on federal policies, federal 
practices, and federal rules, ought not be particularly worthy of state attention.45 
Yet several state supreme courts have followed Twombly or Iqbal for no 
apparent reason. In Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court simply quoted the Supreme Court’s decisions and summarily 
adopted the new federal standard: 
While we have concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaint is insufficient 
[on other grounds], we take the opportunity to adopt the refinement 
of that standard that was recently articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in [Twombly]. The Supreme Court ruled that the 
often-quoted language in [Conley]—“a complaint should not be dismissed 
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would 
entitle him to relief”—had “earned its retirement.” The Court pointed 
out that under Conley’s “no set of facts” standard, “a wholly conclusory 
statement of claim would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the 
pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish 
some ‘set of [undisclosed] facts’ to support recovery.” As the Court 
stated, “While a complaint attacked by a . . . motion to dismiss does not 
need detailed factual allegations . . . a plaintiff ’s obligation to provide the 
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief ’ requires more than labels and 
conclusions . . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 
relief above the speculative level . . . [based] on the assumption that all 
the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) . . . .” 
What is required at the pleading stage are factual “allegations plausibly 
suggesting (not merely consistent with)” an entitlement to relief, in 
order to “reflect[] the threshold requirement . . . that the ‘plain statement’ 
possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” 
We agree with the Supreme Court’s analysis of the Conley language 
. . . and we follow the Court’s lead in retiring its use. The clarified 
 
45 See A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading in State Courts After Twombly and Iqbal 20 (July 1, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038349 [http://perma.cc/
HLV4-27KJ] (“[I]f a notice-pleading jurisdiction has previously expressed its commitment to simplified 
pleading for various policy reasons such as promoting access to justice, it should not treat Twombly 
and Iqbal as undermining such policies in any way. Rather, those decisions reflect the Supreme 
Court’s embrace of different policy concerns that states should feel free to discount when addressing 
pleading in their own systems.”); see also Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, 
Pleading Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1455 (2008) (urging states 
without strong e-discovery regimes to consider their own state’s institutional concerns before 
following Twombly). 
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standard for rule 12(b)(6) motions adopted here will apply to any 
amended complaint that the plaintiffs may file.46 
This passage is remarkable. Before Twombly, Massachusetts courts had 
adhered to Conley and its “no set of facts” formulation for thirty years without 
deviation.47 Yet the court in Iannacchino was so anxious to follow the Supreme 
Court that it adopted the momentous Twombly standard, without any consideration 
of stare decisis, state law, state policies, or state practices. For Massachusetts, 
the fact that the Supreme Court said it was enough. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a case called Data Key Partners, also 
adopted the Twombly “plausibility” standard,48 despite Wisconsin’s long 
previous adherence to the Conley “no set of facts” standard.49 As in Iannacchino, 
the Wisconsin court recited the Twombly opinion and adopted it without 
engaging in a state-specific policy analysis.50 In yet another example, the 
Supreme Court of South Dakota adopted the Twombly pleading standard 
merely because the federal rule and the state rule both require a “showing” of 
entitlement to relief but offered no reasoning based on state policy.51 
These state courts were caught in the Supreme Court’s gravitational pull. 
They followed Twombly primarily because the Supreme Court decided it rather 
than because they exercised rigorous independent judgment in accordance with 
state law and policy. 
Exercising rigorous independent judgment based on appropriate state 
considerations should not have been difficult. For example, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Maine adopted the Twombly standard after noting that the 
federal and state rules were practically identical.52 The court then determined 
that the rationale of Twombly applied to the kind of civil-perjury claims at 
 
46 888 N.E.2d 879, 889-90 (Mass. 2008) (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). 
47 See Dodson, supra note 10, at 18 (noting that the Massachusetts courts “had followed the ‘no 
set of facts’ standard of Conley for more than 30 years” until Iannacchino). 
48 See Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 849 N.W.2d 693, 701 (Wis. 2014) 
(concluding that the Twombly standard is consistent with Wisconsin state law precedent and 
therefore requiring that plaintiffs allege facts that plausibly suggest they are entitled to relief). 
49 See, e.g., Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 700 N.W.2d 180, 186-87 (Wis. 2005) (citing 
Wisconsin precedent that stands for the proposition that a court should not dismiss a plaintiff ’s 
claims “unless it appears to a certainty” that the plaintiff cannot prove “any set of facts” that would 
entitle him to relief). 
50 The court suggested that Twombly was consistent with Wisconsin precedent, but that 
assertion rings hollow given the Wisconsin courts’ long adherence to Conley and the novelty of the 
“plausibility” standard. See Data Key Partners, 849 N.W.2d at 699-701. 
51 See Sisney v. Best Inc., 754 N.W.2d 804, 808-09 (S.D. 2008) (pointing to the language of the 
South Dakota statute that contains the State’s pleading requirements, and based on two words in 
that statute, deciding to adopt the Supreme Court’s “new standards”). 
52 See Bean v. Cummings, 939 A.2d 676, 680 (Me. 2008) (explaining that the court will use 
constructions of a federal rule as aids in construing the state provision if a Maine Rule of Civil 
Procedure is identical to the federal rule). 
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issue and that the Twombly standard was needed to further the state policy of 
curbing abusive use of those claims.53 And the Supreme Court of Nebraska 
offered a defensible assessment of federal pleading standards and their 
desirability in Nebraska courts.54 
Yet although the Maine and Nebraska decisions did more than rely on the 
mere pronouncement of the Supreme Court, their timing suggests they were 
not truly independent. As I have written previously, “It is highly suspicious 
that, after 50 years of adherence to Conley, these state courts happened to 
conclude independently—just after the Supreme Court did—that their 
pleading rules require New Pleading strictures, too.”55 
The gravitational force of federal law is not irresistible; several state 
supreme courts have rejected Twombly and Iqbal.56 But these instances of 
resistance actually confirm the Supreme Court’s gravitational pull. Compare, 
for example, the perfunctory and facile adoption of the federal pleading 
change in Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and South Dakota,57 with the rejection 
of the new federal standard by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in a discussion 
spanning a dozen pages in Webb.58 That the Tennessee Supreme Court spilled 
so much ink resisting the Supreme Court shows the strength of the Court’s 
gravitational pull. Further, the Tennessee court’s opinion devotes several pages 
 
53 See id. at 680 (adopting the Twombly standard for Maine civil perjury cases because “[o]n 
certain subjects understood to raise a high risk of abusive litigation, a plaintiff must state factual 
allegations with greater particularity than Rule 8 requires”). 
54 See Doe v. Bd. of Regents, 788 N.W.2d 264, 274-78 (Neb. 2010) (explaining that “the 
Nebraska Rules of Pleading in Civil Cases are modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” 
and concluding, after discussion, that the Twombly standard provides a balanced approach for 
determining the sufficiency of a complaint). 
55 See Dodson, supra note 10, at 17. One exception is the District of Columbia, which is required 
by federal statute to follow federal precedent for like-worded rules. See D.C. CODE § 11-946 (2014) 
(requiring the District of Columbia’s Superior Court to conduct its business in accordance with the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure unless the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals approves the Superior Court’s modification of those federal rules); see also 
Potomac Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 28 A.3d 531, 543 (D.C. 2011) (following the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure pleading standard in light of D.C. Code § 11-946); Behradrezaee v. Dashtara, 910 
A.2d 349, 356 n.8 (D.C. 2006) (“We construe rules that are substantially identical to the corresponding 
federal rule in light of the meaning given to the federal rule.”). 
56 See, e.g., Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 P.3d 344, 346-48 (Ariz. 2008); Hawkeye 
Foodservice Distrib., Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp., 812 N.W.2d 600, 608-09 (Iowa 2012); Walsh v. 
U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Minn. 2014); Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, 
Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 430 (Tenn. 2011); Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 955 A.2d 1082, 1086 n.1 (Vt. 2008); 
McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 863-64 (Wash. 2010); Roth v. DeFelicecare, Inc., 
700 S.E.2d 183, 189 n.4 (W. Va. 2010). 
57 See discussion supra notes 46–51. 
58 346 S.W.3d at 425-37. 
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to exhaustively criticizing the Supreme Court’s standard on its own terms.59 
This is curious because Twombly and Iqbal need not be wrong on their own 
terms for them to be wrong for Tennessee. Questioning the federal decisions on 
their own terms weakened their force and better enabled state court resistance. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s recent rejection of Twombly in Walsh is 
similar.60 The court noted that the similarities between federal and state law 
made the Supreme Court’s views “‘instructive’ but not binding” and proceeded 
to reject plausibility on state textual and policy grounds.61 The analysis is 
thorough, careful, and exceptionally detailed. But, like the Tennessee case, 
Walsh is notable for how much effort it spends discussing, analyzing, and 
distinguishing the federal precedents. 
Thus, even examples of state resistance reveal a federal gravitational force. 
Perhaps the only true exception comes from the Iowa Supreme Court, which 
simply put the burden on the party advocating for the federal change to 
demonstrate that the change was warranted.62 In that case, the defendants had 
neither “presented this court with any evidence that our state court system is 
facing the sort of systemic pressures that contributed to the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Twombly and Iqbal,” and neither party “addressed countervailing 
policy considerations that may exist” but instead “rel[ied] only on the similarities 
between the federal rule and the Iowa rule.”63 The court concluded: “Based 
on this record, there is an insufficient basis to make such an important change 
in our rules.”64 
Iowa is a lone outlier in a set of examples that illustrates the substantial 
default effect that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal rules has on state 
courts construing analogous state rules. Those state courts that follow simply 
go with the flow. State courts that resist struggle to do so. The reason is the same: 
the gravitational force of the Supreme Court’s decisions pulls them in. 
 
59 See id. at 430-31 (concluding that the federal Twombly standard substantively departed from 
the Supreme Court’s prior interpretation of this pleading standard, causing “a loss of clarity, stability, 
and predictability in federal pleadings practice”). 
60 Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 600. 
61 See id. at 603. The Minnesota Supreme Court had also favorably cited to Twombly and Iqbal 
previously. See Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010) (holding that “[a] plaintiff 
must provide more than labels and conclusions” and citing Twombly for that proposition); Hebert v. 
City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Minn. 2008) (citing Twombly for the proposition that a 
plaintiff ’s foundation for relief must be based on more than legal conclusions). 
62 Hawkeye Foodservice Distrib., Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp., 812 N.W.2d 600, 608 (Iowa 2012). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. I do not mean to express a normative preference for Iowa’s approach. Indeed, Iowa could 
be criticized for failing to take the opportunity to engage the Supreme Court’s opinions in an effort 
to approach its own state question with newly opened eyes. I only note that the very idea that a 
nonbinding Supreme Court decision should open state courts’ eyes reflects the phenomenon that I 
mean to show. 
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b. State Conformity Under Dissimilar Rules 
The gravitational pull of federal law can be so forceful that state courts 
follow federal courts even when the language of their state rules is different 
from the language of federal rules. Pleading standards again present a useful 
example, for Rule 8 and its federal interpretation have exerted a strong 
gravitational pull even on states that retained code pleading.65 
A useful 2001 study by Thom Main illustrates this phenomenon. Main 
studied the way state courts in code-pleading states reacted to federal court 
interpretations of federal rules on pleading and summary judgment.66 Main 
selected states whose rules were among those least influenced by the federal 
rules.67 In Illinois, Main found “persuasive evidence of substantial intra-state 
uniformity, notwithstanding the fundamental differences between code 
pleading . . . and notice pleading,”68 as well as evidence that Illinois state 
courts followed the Supreme Court’s interpretive gloss on pleading and 
summary judgment under the Federal Rules.69 Main also found similar 
following in Pennsylvania.70 Further, both states marched in tune—with 
relatively consistent lag times—with the federal changes to summary judgment 
after Celotex,71 despite different summary-judgment rule texts.72 And Edward 
Cavanaugh has reported that state appellate courts in New York—a code-
pleading state—are using the Supreme Court’s “plausibility” standard even 
though it applies only to pleadings in federal court.73 
Note how the Supreme Court’s gravitational pull on state courts compounds 
the overall gravitational effect of federal law. The federal rules pull state 
rulemakers toward parallel state rules in the first instance, resulting in rampant 
 
65 See Chen, supra note 45, at 1440 & n.65 (noting the code-pleading states Florida, Louisiana, 
and Nebraska followed the pleading rules articulated by the Supreme Court in Conley). 
66 Main, supra note 20, at 326-29. 
67 Id. at 326-27. 
68 Id. at 344-45. 
69 Id. at 344. 
70 Id. at 353. 
71 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
72 Id. at 364-68. Main’s findings in a third code-pleading state, Nebraska, were different. There, 
both state and federal courts appeared to adhere to fact pleading even after Leatherman v. Tarrant 
County, 507 U.S. 163 (1993). Id. at 359. In addition, Nebraska specifically rejected Celotex in 1995, 
even though the state rule was identical to the federal rule. Id. at 369-70. I discuss these implications 
in Part III. 
73 Edward D. Cavanagh, The Impact of Twombly on Antitrust Actions Brought in the State Courts, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2013, at 1, 7 (“Although the New York Court of Appeals did not cite 
Twombly, the decision is unquestionably Twombly-esque in two important respects. First, the court 
asserts that to survive a motion to dismiss, an antitrust claim must be ‘plausible.’ Second, the court 
undertook the kind of detailed vetting of the complaint that Twombly demands. While New York’s 
highest court has not specifically addressed the question of how Twombly bears on state court 
pleading requirements, Equitas would appear to put New York in the Twombly camp.”). 
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mimicry. Even when state rulemakers do resist, state courts are still drawn to 
interpret divergent state rules in a manner that approaches the interpretation 
of the federal rules. The overall effect amplifies the gravitational force of 
federal law. 
3.  Other Procedural Rules 
The gravitational force of federal procedural law extends to other procedural 
regimes. More than forty states mimic the Federal Rules of Evidence,74 and 
states often follow the Supreme Court’s gloss on those rules, such as its 
controversial Daubert decision regarding the admissibility of expert 
testimony.75 State following is pervasive in evidence law even in the few non-
replica states.76 Likewise, roughly half the states have modeled their own rules 
of criminal procedure on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.77 This 
broader landscape suggests that the same gravitational pull of federal law affects 
a wide swath of procedural rules. 
B.  Substantive Areas 
The gravitational pull of federal law is not restricted to matters of procedure. 
I also find evidence of a gravitational pull in both statutory law and constitutional 
law. In using these examples, I do not mean to suggest that states always follow 
federal substantive law. As with procedure, such a position is manifestly 
 
74 See 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, 
at T-1 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2011). 
75 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Before Daubert, almost all of 
the states followed the seventy-year-old federal standard articulated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Within six years, nineteen states had switched to the standard articulated in 
Daubert. See Stephen Mahle, The Impact of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., on Expert 
Testimony: With Applications to Securities Litigation, FLA. B.J., Mar. 1999, at 3, 36. 
76 See, e.g., People v. Falsetta, 986 P.2d 182, 192-93 (Cal. 1999) (interpreting California’s 
propensity-evidence bar for sex-crime prosecutions similarly to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
despite textual dissimilarities). See generally Alex Stein, Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L. 
REV. 65, 105-24 (2008) (arguing that state judges interpret state rules of evidence similarly to how 
the Supreme Court interprets the Federal Rules of Evidence in order to make what appears to be 
the correct decision and to further their reputation). 
77 See, e.g., State v. Crowe, 168 S.W.3d 731, 741 n.3 (Tenn. 2005) (“The Tennessee Rules were 
patterned after the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”). For surveys, see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE 
ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.2(f), at 50 (2d ed. 1999) (“Roughly half of the states have court 
rules of criminal procedure or statutory codes of criminal procedure that borrow heavily from the 
Federal Rules.”); Jerold Israel, Federal Criminal Procedure as a Model for the States, 543 ANN. AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 130, 138 n.18 (1996) (identifying Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, 
West Virginia, and Wyoming as states with court rules or statutory codes modeled on the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure). 
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untenable; counterexamples abound.78 But by documenting varied and 
unexpected instances of uncoerced state following, I bring to light the 
potential breadth of the gravitational pull of federal law. 
1. Statutes: Employment Discrimination 
Federal employment-discrimination law—primarily Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)—has inspired copycat state statutory 
regimes, and developments in federal case law quickly echo in state jurisprudence. 
That is true even though there are differences in the drafting histories of 
federal and state employment-discrimination laws, and even though state 
policies might differ markedly from federal policies.79 
Of course, the social and legal push to outlaw employment discrimination 
was, in that era, made at both the federal and state levels, so it is unsurprising 
that this common cause would produce both federal and state employment-
discrimination reform in roughly the same time period. But that explanation 
is satisfactory only at a general level. Even for a common cause such as the 
prohibition of employment discrimination, one would expect state-specific 
policy preferences and local cultures to affect both the timing and the details 
of how the states implemented their solutions. 
Yet the degree of state following is surprising not only in timing but also in 
detail. States generally tended to act shortly after the federal statutes passed, 
and with a high level of mimicry. Prior to Title VII’s passage in 1964, states 
were not very successful in combating employment discrimination.80 After 
Title VII, most states swiftly and successfully enacted laws substantially 
mirroring Title VII’s provisions.81 States also quickly followed the federal 
ADEA (1967) and ADA (1990) with their own state protections drawn from the  
 
78 See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third 
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988) (acknowledging that “[u]nemployment compensation, 
minimum-wage laws, public financing of political campaigns, no-fault insurance, hospital cost 
containment, and prohibitions against discrimination in housing and employment all originated in 
state legislatures”); Steele & Tsoflias, supra note 6, at 1375 (identifying some states with broader 
constitutional protections of civil liberties, including free speech and privacy rights); Benjamin J. 
Beaton, Note, Walking the Federalist Tightrope: A National Policy of State Experimentation for Health 
Information Technology, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1670, 1688-93 (2008) (surveying some of the various 
health information initiatives that states implemented in the absence of federal action). 
79 For an introduction to the relationship between state and federal employment-discrimination 
laws, see generally Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .”: Divergent Interpretations of State 
and Federal Employment Discrimination Statues, 40 GA. L. REV. 469 (2006); Sandra F. Sperino, Revitalizing 
State Employment Discrimination Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 545 (2013). 
80 See Long, supra note 79, at 477 (“State attempts to address employment discrimination were 
generally seen as failures at the time of Title VII’s enactment in 1964.”). 
81 See Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Use and Abuse 
of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 91 (2002) (“After Title VII was enacted, all of the states that 
2016] The Gravitational Force of Federal Law 721 
federal provisions.82 As one commentator put it, “[F]ederal law has traditionally 
set the standard for individual rights in the employment context, with state 
legislatures and courts taking their cues from federal law.”83 
It is true that some states added greater protections,84 and it is also true 
that most states modified at least some of the federal language in deliberate 
ways.85 But the extent of the similarities is striking. Aside from isolated pockets 
of novelty, states have approached antidiscrimination lawmaking principally 
by plagiarizing the federal statutes,86 with little legislative history revealing 
why Congress’s particular wording should be so perfectly and universally apt 
for different states. 
Likewise, state judicial interpretations of state statutes have tended to track 
federal interpretations of the federal statutes.87 One might expect some 
interpretive similarities when statutory texts, histories, and goals are similar.88 
But state courts typically conform to federal court interpretations of federal 
statutes with relatively paltry analysis of countervailing considerations.89 Many 
states even adhere to an asserted principle of construction that federal opinions 
concerning federal law are highly persuasive, if not controlling, on the question 
of the proper interpretation of a parallel state law.90 Indeed, “state courts 
 
previously lacked antidiscrimination laws adopted them.”); Long, supra note 79, at 477 (“[I]t was not 
until Title VII became law that a majority of states adopted their own antidiscrimination statutes.”). 
82 See Goldfarb, supra note 81, at 91; Alex Long, State Anti-Discrimination Law as a Model for 
Amending the Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 597, 628 (2004) (describing the 
influence of the ADA on state antidiscrimination laws and concluding that “[t]he enactment of the 
ADA has clearly had a strong influence on state antidiscrimination statutes and interpretive 
regulations”). However, as Professor Sandra Sperino notes, there are differences in the processes of 
enactment of state and federal statutes (for example, most state statutes were passed as a part of 
omnibus bills). Sperino, supra note 79, at 558-61. 
83 Long, supra note 79, at 478. 
84 See Goldfarb, supra note 81, at 91 (noting that many state employment discrimination 
statutes are considerably more protective of employees rights than the federal version). 
85 See Sperino, supra note 79, at 561 (“[T]here is not a single state statute that contains the 
same statutory language as the federal statutes, even when confining such consideration to 
substantive, rather than procedural or administrative, problems.”). 
86 See Long, supra note 79, at 473 (“[F]ederal and state antidiscrimination laws typically ran 
parallel to one another. Indeed, in many instances, a state’s antidiscrimination statute was based 
upon or used language almost identical to federal law.”). 
87 Id. at 477. In addition, some state statutes require conforming interpretation with federal 
precedent. Id. 
88 See id. 
89 Id. 
90 See id. at 473 (asserting that, because state antidiscrimination statutes were often based on 
federal law and because “federal decisional law concerning a parallel statute is highly persuasive,” state 
appellate courts would often interpret their own state antidiscrimination statutes in the same manner 
that federal courts had interpreted the parallel federal statute); Sperino, supra note 79, at 582-83 
(considering the reasons state courts may defer to federal courts when interpreting their own state 
antidiscrimination statutes, including the ideas that federal and state statutes in this area have a common 
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sometimes appear to bend over backwards in construing state antidiscrimination 
statutes in order to keep state and federal law on the same track.”91 
For example, in 1973, the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII to require a 
unique burden-shifting framework for establishing a prima facie case of 
employment discrimination.92 Despite the fact that the Court’s framework was 
pure judicial gloss on a federal statute, state courts promptly adopted the 
burden-shifting framework for their own state statutes.93 A disagreement 
among lower courts—including state courts—then developed as to whether the 
framework involved a burden of production or a burden of persuasion.94 In 
1993, the Supreme Court answered that the framework under federal law 
involved a burden of production.95 Again, states promptly and uniformly 
followed suit, even those that had previously imposed a burden of persuasion.96 
Another example of state court following is the so-called “Faragher/Ellerth” 
defense. In those cases, the Court was asked whether an employer could be liable 
under Title VII to an employee harassed by coworkers.97 Rejecting traditional 
common law agency principles as inconsistent with the policies and goals of 
Title VII, the Court created a two-part affirmative defense for the employer 
based on whether the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and remedy 
any harassment, and whether the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage 
of any preventive or remedial opportunities provided by the employer.98 No 
part of this affirmative defense is in Title VII; the Court simply fashioned a 
new judicial rule of agency for the federal statutory term “employer.”99 Yet 
despite this convoluted, federal-specific judicial gloss, and despite the availability 
of a trove of traditional agency rules already developed by the states, states have 
largely adopted the Court’s test for state Title VII analogues.100 
 
goal and purpose, that federal courts have had more opportunity to consider antidiscrimination issues, and 
that reading federal and state statutes together is the only practical method). 
91 Long, supra note 79, at 477. 
92 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). 
93 See Long, supra note 79, at 487-88. 
94 See id. 
95 St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 499, 506-07 (1993). 
96 Long, supra note 79, at 487-88. 
97 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 
524 U.S. 742, 746-47 (1998). 
98 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
99 See Sperino, supra note 79, at 573 (“The words ‘tangible employment action’ do not appear 
in Title VII; nor does the two-part affirmative defense created by the Supreme Court. Faragher and 
Ellerth do not represent pure statutory interpretation of Title VII. Rather, in these cases, the 
Supreme Court has created, using common law-type reasoning, a federal law of agency for Title VII 
that is not dependent on the statutory language.” (footnotes omitted)). 
100 See id. at 573 (“In cases where the federal courts are gap filling federal statutes using 
common law reasoning, there is greater reason to be skeptical about importing these concepts into 
state law. Nonetheless, courts interpreting state employment discrimination statutes have applied 
the agency analysis created in Faragher and Ellerth.”) 
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As with pleading rules, the lure of statutory following is powerful even 
when the text of the state statute differs meaningfully from the federal 
statute.101 California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) defines 
“disability” in a significantly different way than the federal ADA: the ADA 
requires that a disability “substantially limit[]” an individual while the FEHA 
requires only a limitation.102 Federal courts concluded that the term 
“substantially” in the ADA imposed a meaningful restriction on the type of 
disability eligible under the ADA.103 Yet despite the absence of “substantially” 
in the FEHA, California courts repeatedly interpreted the FEHA the same 
as the ADA, even relying on federal ADA cases for support.104 Eventually, 
the California legislature had to pass a “we really meant it” amendment to 
the statute to make the proper standard—no substantiality was needed—
clear.105 Such was the strength of the gravitational pull of the ADA. 
Such egregious examples exist throughout employment law. After the 
Supreme Court held that Title VII’s statute of limitations began to run when 
the discriminatory act occurred,106 Congress abrogated the Court’s decision by 
amending the statute of limitations to begin to run when the individual is 
affected.107 Nevertheless, courts of several states whose legislatures failed to 
enact a similar amendment interpreted their state statutes of limitations as if 
they had been amended like Title VII.108 Even in the face of nonconforming 
state law, federal law pulls the states. 
Of course, the gravitational force of federal law is not irresistible, and state 
courts have not always blindly followed federal antidiscrimination precedent.109 
For example, although many state courts followed the controversial Supreme 
Court decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,110 which held that a person 
 
101 See Long, supra note 79, at 495 (documenting state court interpretations that “finesse the 
textual differences where they exist”). 
102 See id. at 509-10 (“Rather than defining disabilities in terms of substantial limitations, the 
FEHA simply spoke of limitations of major life activities. As numerous federal courts had concluded 
that Congress’s inclusion of the word ‘substantially’ worked to limit dramatically the scope of the 
ADA’s definition, this difference should have been significant.”). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 See id. at 509 (“Ultimately, the California legislature stepped in with an amendment that 
restated the obvious in no uncertain terms: notwithstanding any inconsistent interpretation, the 
legislature intended state law to require a limitation rather than a substantial limitation.”). 
106 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 622 (2007). 
107 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–2, 123 Stat. 5. 
108 See, e.g., Summy-Long v. Penn. St. Univ., No. 1:06-cv-1117, 2010 WL 1253472, at *11 (M.D. 
Pa. Mar. 24, 2010) (“PHRA should still be interpreted consistently with Title VII despite Title VII’s 
change in language.”), rev’d on other grounds, 2010 WL 4514312 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2010). 
109 See Long, supra note 79, at 473-74 (admitting that “a number of state appellate courts in 
recent years have declined to follow federal court interpretations of employment discrimination 
statutes when dealing with their own parallel state statutes”). 
110 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
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with a disability that could be corrected (such as by wearing eyeglasses) was 
not disabled within the meaning of the ADA, a few state courts have diverged.111 
In Dahill v. Police Department of Boston,112 the Massachusetts high court refused 
to follow Sutton because: (1) the state legislative history was different from 
the ADA’s legislative history; (2) the Massachusetts agency charged with 
interpreting and enforcing the state law had concluded that corrective measures 
should not be considered, and that interpretation was entitled to substantial 
deference by state courts; and (3) the state statute specifically directed courts 
to construe the statute liberally in favor of disabled persons.113 But, as in other 
areas, even counterexamples like Dahill are suggestive of the gravitational pull 
of federal law. To reach its decision—a pure question of state law—the 
Massachusetts court need not have cited Sutton at all; yet it felt compelled to 
spend considerable effort to distinguish and distance Sutton.114 
2.  Constitutions: Bowers 
Federal constitutional law has long exerted a pervasive pull on state 
constitutional law.115 However, given the nature of constitutional law, state 
constitutional following is particularly puzzling. Constitutional law often 
involves sensitive and important policy matters, on which local preferences tend 
to be stronger, more unified, and more extreme than national preferences.116 
 
111 See Long, supra note 79, at 510-17 (describing how some state courts followed Sutton, while 
others diverged). 
112 748 N.E.2d 956 (Mass. 2001). 
113 Id. at 959-64. 
114 Id. at 963. 
115 See, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, Path Dependence and the External Constraints on Independent 
State Constitutionalism, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 783, 783 (2011) (asserting that the promise of 
independent state constitutionalism “has gone largely unfulfilled”); Robert F. Williams, Methodology 
Problems in Enforcing State Constitutional Rights, 3 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 143, 165 (1986-1987) 
(recognizing the “often unstated premise that United States Supreme Court interpretations of the 
federal Bill of Rights are presumptively correct for interpreting analogous state provisions”). Of 
course, the earliest constitutional law follower was the federal Bill of Rights, which drew from 
various state constitutions and colonial experiences. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions 
and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 501-02 (1977) (“[T]he drafters of the 
federal Bill of Rights drew upon corresponding provisions in the various state constitutions . . . . 
And prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, these state bills of rights, independently 
interpreted, were the primary restraints on state action since the federal Bill of Rights had been held 
inapplicable.”). For more information, see generally JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM (2005), LEONARD 
W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1999); DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1988); ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791 (1962). But, since then, state constitutions have tended to follow the U.S. 
Constitution rather than vice versa. 
116 See Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 52 (2006) (noting 
the theory “that state constitutions are the repositories of the authoring community’s fundamental 
values”). But see GARDNER, supra note 115, at 53-79 (contesting the theory that state values have 
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Further, state constitutions have a different history and erect a different 
governmental structure than the federal Constitution. Finally, constitutional 
governance is the most prominent feature of popular sovereignty, a cherished 
American ideal.117 These factors suggest that states should exercise independence 
in state constitutionalism, relying on the preferences of their particular populaces, 
with sensitivity to the nuances of their state governmental structures. 
Yet state constitutional autonomy has not materialized.118 Instead, all states 
have declarations of rights that track the federal Bill of Rights,119 sometimes 
with a startling degree of mimicry.120 Likewise, state court interpretations of 
state constitutions have tended to follow federal court interpretations of the 
U.S. Constitution,121 even to the point of adopting the Supreme Court’s tests 
 
sufficient intrastate homogeneity and interstate heterogeneity to be strong forces of constitutional 
variation); James A. Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and the Interpretation of 
State Constitutions: A Case Study in Constitutional Argument, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1219, 1227 (1998) 
(concluding that cultural distinctions between the South and the rest of America make no difference 
for state constitutional interpretation). 
117 See GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 340-80 
(1969) (discussing the transformation of the American political system between the Declaration of 
Independence and the U.S. Constitution). 
118 See James A. Gardner, Autonomy and Isomorphism: The Unfulfilled Promise of Structural 
Autonomy in American State Constitutions, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 31, 34 (2014) (noting that “state 
constitutions tend to converge strongly with one another and with the U.S. Constitution”). 
119 See Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 
332-33 (2011) (“Every state has a bill of rights, and almost all of them reproduce in some form or 
another the full list of rights protected by the federal Bill of Rights.”). It is true that states also have 
constitutionalized rights that the U.S. Constitution does not, such as the right to a public education. 
See JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION (2006) (presenting a 
comprehensive study of the 114 state constitutional conventions with recorded debates); A. E. Dick 
Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 917 
(1976) (noting that at the time of publication, “forty-two state constitutions direct the legislature to 
establish a system of schools”). State constitutions are also frequently amended and highly detailed 
charters of state government. See Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism 
Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1644-45 (2014). But when state constitutions speak to rights also 
protected by the U.S. Constitution, they usually follow the U.S. Constitution. Counterexamples 
tend to be in constitutional criminal law. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 115, at 500 (citing California’s 
and Hawaii’s greater search protections, Michigan’s broader right to counsel, and South Dakota’s 
and Maine’s broader jury-trial right). Yet even in criminal procedure, other states have been known 
to follow federal constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Rhoades v. State, 233 P.3d 61, 65-66 (Idaho 
2010) (listing state cases that follow the Supreme Court’s non-retroactivity rule of Teague v. Lane, 
489 U.S. 288 (1989)). 
120 Compare, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (“The Legislature shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion.”), with U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion . . . .”). See generally Friedman, supra note 115, at 790 (“Textual variations 
in individual rights provisions are often slight.”). 
121 See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 194-95 
(2009) (analyzing the nature and function of state constitutions by contrast to the federal 
Constitution, including the judicial interpretation issues that arise under state constitutions and the 
processes for their amendment and revision); Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State 
Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 338 (2002) (“[S]ystematic studies demonstrate 
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and interpretive methodologies.122 For example, nearly all states have 
interpreted their equal protection guarantees to incorporate the same tiers of 
scrutiny that the U.S. Supreme Court has developed for the federal Equal 
Protection Clause.123 To be sure, pockets of state independence exist, such as 
discrete areas of constitutional criminal law.124 But, for the most part, state 
courts construe their own state constitutional protections in lockstep with 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of analogous federal provisions, slavishly 
incorporating the Supreme Court’s doctrinal standards and buzzwords.125 
The result is an epidemic pathology in state constitutional law in which state 
courts routinely choose to follow the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court,126 
even when the state constitution purports to protect rights more broadly than 
the U.S. Constitution.127 Some state courts even follow the U.S. Supreme 
 
that most state courts, when presented with the opportunity, have chosen not to depart from federal 
precedents when interpreting the rights-granting provisions of state constitutions. In other words, 
the majority of state courts, on most issues, engage in an analysis in lockstep with their federal 
counterparts.” (citations omitted)). 
122 Blocher, supra note 119, at 334 (“Despite their formal interpretive independence, state courts 
have generally followed the Supreme Court’s lead, adopting its tests and doctrines as their own.”). The 
impetus of state court following is, for the most part, judicially sui generis, though it is constitutionally 
mandated in a few states. See Thomas C. Marks, Jr., Federalism and the Florida Constitution: The Self-Inflicted 
Wounds of Thrown-Away Independence from the Control of the U.S. Supreme Court, 66 ALB. L. REV. 701, 701-
05 (2003) (noting that Florida’s constitution directs its state courts to follow the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth and Eighth Amendments, even when the state courts are 
adjudicating claims solely under the Florida constitution). 
123 See, e.g., Robotham v. State, 488 N.W.2d 533, 539 (Neb. 1992) (“The Nebraska Constitution 
has identical requirements [to the Equal Protection Clause].”). See generally JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, 
EQUALITY AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15-44 (2008) 
(discussing states’ application of “the federal model of equality”); Christopher R. Leslie, Embracing 
Loving: Trait-Specific Marriage Laws and Heightened Scrutiny, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1086 (2014) 
(noting that most state courts apply the Supreme Court’s tiers of scrutiny in evaluating equal 
protection claims). 
124 See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 KY. L.J. 873, 
873-75 (1975) (discussing the trend of state courts evading Supreme Court review through the 
“doctrine of adequate state grounds” by “basing [their] judgment[s] on [] state right[s] which [are] 
coextensive with or broader than rights afforded by federal law”). 
125 See Blocher, supra note 119, at 339 (“[E]ither from force of habit, mistaken belief that they 
were bound by the federal rules, lack of expertise, or simply because they agreed with the Burger 
Court’s reasoning, most state courts continued to apply their own constitutional provisions in 
lockstep with federal analogues.”). 
126 See Williams, supra note 115, at 165 (asserting that the “often unstated premise that United 
States Supreme Court interpretations of the federal Bill of Rights are presumptively correct for 
interpreting analogous state provisions . . . . exerts a significant amount of intuitive force upon 
lawyers and judges grappling with problems of state constitutional interpretation”); id. at 152 (arguing 
that when a state constitution mirrors the U.S. Constitution, a Supreme Court interpretation of the 
federal provision “cast[s] a confusing ‘shadow’ over the interpretation of the analogous state 
constitutional provision”). 
127 See Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court is Not Supreme, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 979, 1059-
60 (2010) (citing JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 243 (2008)) (arguing that while there are times when courts expand rights 
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Court’s reasoning as an express matter of course. For example, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court has stated that the guarantee of freedom of speech is the same 
under both the Nebraska Constitution and the U.S. Constitution, and it 
adopted the policy of following the reasoning and analytical framework of the 
Supreme Court to interpret the guarantee under its own state constitution.128 
Other state courts recognize their ability to depart from federal court 
reasoning but erect doctrinal barriers to exercising that ability. For example, 
Washington presumptively follows nonbinding federal court decisions unless 
contrary considerations override that presumption, such as differing text, differing 
history, differing structure, preexisting state law, and matters of particular state 
or local concern.129 This model essentially codifies the federal gravitational pull: 
go with the flow unless some countervailing force enables resistance. 
Consider the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1986 opinion in 
Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia statute 
criminalizing sodomy.130 The Court found no fundamental right to engage in 
sodomy and therefore found Georgia’s statutory prohibition valid under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.131 By rejecting a rights-
expansive construction of the U.S. Constitution, Bowers left state courts free 
 
based on state constitutions, this remains outside of the norm); see also Ronald L.K. Collins, Rebirth 
of Reliance on State Charters; A Fresh Look at Old Issues, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 12, 1984, at 25-32 (cataloguing 
several hundred state cases between 1974 and 1984 where state courts provided more rights under 
their state constitutions than had been provided under the U.S. Constitution). For a comparison of 
the protections provided by state constitutions versus the protections provided by the federal 
Constitution, see WILLIAMS, supra note 121, at 113-34. 
128 Pick v. Nelson, 528 N.W.2d 309, 317 (Neb. 1995) (“[W]e do not distinguish between the two 
constitutions in our analysis of this issue.”); cf. Robotham v. State, 488 N.W.2d 533, 539 (Neb. 1992) 
(treating the state and federal rights to privacy as indistinguishable because “[n]o Nebraska case 
recognizes a right to privacy, based on our Constitution, broader than the narrow federal 
constitutional right”). 
129 See Linda White Atkins, Note, Federalism, Uniformity, and the State Constitution—State v. 
Gunwall, 106 Wn. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), 62 WASH. L. REV. 569, 578-80 (1987) (listing the six 
criteria the Gunwall court used to decide when outcomes should be different based on a state 
constitution: textual language, significant differences in provisions, state constitutional and common 
law history, preexisting state law, differences in the structure of Constitutions, and matters of particular 
state or local concern). This paradigm is the inverse of that urged by Justice Brennan: 
[S]tate court judges, and also practitioners, do well to scrutinize constitutional 
decisions by federal courts, for only if they are found to be logically persuasive and 
well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific 
constitutional guarantees, may they properly claim persuasive weight as guideposts 
when interpreting counterpart state guarantees. 
Brennan, supra note 115, at 502. 
130 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). In using 
Bowers as an illustration, I in no way mean to imply that all of constitutional law can be reduced to 
this particular, or even some other particular, issue. Bowers merely illustrates how the general 
phenomenon of the federal constitutional gravitational force operates. 
131 Id. 
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to construe their own state constitutions more broadly in ways that would 
invalidate state sodomy statutes on state constitutional grounds. But, by and 
large, states did not. Rather, in the immediate aftermath of Bowers, states 
tended to hew closely to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Bowers when 
interpreting their own constitutions. 
States’ preference for following the Supreme Court’s reasoning had 
interesting implications in Georgia because Georgia’s constitution confers state 
privacy rights that are greater than those of the federal Constitution.132 Thus, 
Georgia courts were free—even encouraged—to invalidate on state grounds the 
very statute Bowers upheld on federal grounds. Yet in Christiansen v. State, the 
Georgia Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Georgia’s sodomy-
solicitation statute on state constitutional grounds.133 The state court could have 
found the statute constitutional simply by relying on the Georgia constitution 
and state court precedent. Instead the relatively short opinion relies primarily on 
Bowers to find that “the proscription against sodomy is a legitimate and valid 
exercise of state police power in furtherance of the moral welfare of the public. 
Our constitution does not deny the legislative branch the right to prohibit such 
conduct.”134 Other state courts construing sodomy statutes in the immediate 
aftermath of Bowers treated it with similar gravitas.135 
A few states did reject Bowers. In Commonwealth v. Wasson, the Kentucky 
Supreme Court held Kentucky’s sodomy statute unconstitutional under its 
state constitution.136 But even Wasson is evidence of Bowers’s pull. The Kentucky 
 
132 GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. I; Christiansen v. State, 468 S.E.2d 188, 189 (Ga. 1996) (“[W]e 
have determined that certain provisions of the 1983 Georgia Constitution confer greater rights and 
benefits than the federal constitution.”). 
133 Christiansen, 468 S.E.2d at 190 (“[The sodomy statute] does not violate the right to privacy 
under the Georgia Constitution.”). 
134 Id. at 190. But cf. id. at 191 n.1 (Sears, J., dissenting) (chastising the court for “incorrectly 
consider[ing] Christiansen’s right to privacy argument in light of . . . Bowers”). Two years later, the 
Georgia Supreme Court revisited the issue and held its sodomy statute to violate the state 
constitutional right of privacy. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998). But, by then, the U.S. 
Supreme Court had decided Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), which expanded gay rights, 
indicating a shift in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with which Powell was more consistent. For 
a post-Bowers discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 210–23. 
135 See, e.g., State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987) (relying on Bowers to find Minnesota’s 
commercial-sodomy statute constitutional under the Minnesota constitution); In re Opinion of the 
Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 27 (N.H. 1987) (“The third question posed by the legislature is whether the 
proposed bill [banning same-sex couples from adopting] would violate any substantive right to privacy 
under either the State or Federal Constitution. We answer that it would not, resting our determination 
upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bowers . . . .”); cf. State v. Smith, 766 So.2d 501, 
508-10 (La. 2000) (relying on Bowers to find Louisiana’s sodomy-solicitation statute constitutional 
under the Louisiana constitution). Of course, instances of true state independence exist. See, e.g., 
Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250. 259-61 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding Tennessee’s prohibition 
on “Homosexual Acts” unconstitutional under the Tennessee Constitution while relying primarily on 
state law and appropriately asserting that Bowers does not control). 
136 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1993). 
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court discussed or quoted Bowers a dozen separate times throughout its 
decision, both to distinguish the case and to attack it as wrongly decided.137 
Further, the two dissents in Wasson extensively engage Bowers for support.138 
The takeaway is that Bowers cast a long shadow in all three opinions. Wasson 
purportedly was decided under the Kentucky state constitution, but the court 
struggled mightily to adhere to state law and policy in the face of Bowers. 
Bowers, of course, was not the last word on gay rights, and I will address 
some of the post-Bowers developments in Part II.139 But Bowers was the last 
rights-restrictive decision on gay rights issued by the Supreme Court, and, 
despite its nonpreemptive status, for a decade it exerted a powerful force 
against state expansion of gay rights.140 
States’ voluntarily following of federal constitutional law, federal statutory 
law, and federal procedural law illustrates the gravitational force of federal law. In 
Part II, I theorize some explanatory vectors behind that gravitational force. 
II. EXPLANATORY VECTORS 
This Part considers the reasons behind federal law’s gravitational force 
and why it is so persistent across different areas of the law and institutional 
actors. The most benign explanation is that federal law gets the law right first, 
and state actors, realizing this, follow as a matter of agreement and judgment. 
Were this Swiftian ideal true,141 perhaps first-year law students (not to mention 
distinguished federal judges) might be saved from the many tribulations of the 
Erie doctrine.142 
But common sense, localism, and history all undermine confidence that 
federal law frequently gets things correct for the states. Further, states often 
follow federal law without much explanation of their reasoning.143 When states 
do explain, their explanation is almost always “because federal law says so.”144 
 
137 Id. at 489-91, 493, 497-99 (“We view [Bowers] as a misdirected application of the theory of 
original intent.”). The court purported to “discuss Bowers in particular, and federal cases in general, 
not in the process of construing the United States Constitution or federal law, but only where their 
reasoning is relevant to discussing questions of state law.” Id. at 489. But in fact, the court’s extensive 
analysis of Bowers suggests that the court went far beyond what was necessary to decide the case 
under the state constitution. 
138 Id. at 503-09 (Lambert, J., dissenting); id. at 509-20 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting). 
139 See infra text accompanying notes 210–23. 
140 See Matthew Coles, The Meaning of Romer v. Evans, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1343, 1357 (1997) 
(explaining how Bowers became the “five hundred pound gorilla of constitutional law and sexual 
orientation” because of its status as governing law and its pervasive “tone”); Cary Franklin, Marrying 
Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 832-34, 844-45, 851-57 
(2014) (giving a broader overview of the gay rights movement beginning in the 1990s). 
141 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
142 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
143 See supra Part I. 
144 See supra Part I. 
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This heavily contrasts with states’ detailed analyses for rejecting federal law.145 
As a result, explanations for state isomorphism generally, and in specific instances, 
need deeper theorizing.146 This Part unearths a number of practical and political 
explanations for federal law’s gravitational pull on the states.147 
A. Resource Conservation 
Maintaining a workable legal system, which is a role co-performed by the 
courts, can be both difficult and time consuming. Why reinvent the wheel? If 
a federal institution adopts a workable (or at least defensible) regime or 
interpretation of federal law, states could co-opt that solution with little effort 
and expense. It is cognitively easier and simpler for states to follow a trodden 
path of federal law than to blaze a new trail. Further, federal models offer a 
non-diminishing public good that can be consumed equally and without 
rivalry by all states. In a world where states have scarce resources, piggybacking 
on the efforts and insights of federal actors seems sensible and even 
economically desirable. 
These practical pressures increase exponentially as they trickle down through 
the legislation-interpretation process. If state lawmakers and rulemakers ride 
on the coattails of the rigorous and detailed work of Congress and federal 
rulemakers, they are likely to record less debate, perform less independent 
factfinding, and produce less legislative and rulemaking history. When state 
courts then confront interpretive questions, they lack the useful tools of 
legislative or rulemaking study and history to which federal courts routinely 
have access.148 The lack of independent state-based interpretative guidance 
 
145 See supra Part I. 
146 The sociological literature defines isomorphism as the tendency of like institutions to adopt 
like organizational structures, often mimetically. For seminal work on non-optimizing isomorphism, 
see Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and 
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147 (1983). The literature focuses on 
organizational structure rather than the legal pronouncements of state and federal institutions, 
though at least one study of horizontal state differentiation exists. See Frederick J. Boehmke & 
Richard Witmer, Disentangling Diffusion: The Effects of Social Learning and Economic Competition on 
State Policy Innovation and Expansion, 57 POL. RES. Q. 39 (2004) (highlighting that economic 
competition diffusion affects both policy innovation and expansion). 
147 I do not hazard guesses about specific explanations for specific instances of state following, 
nor do I undertake the very complicated analyses for why some states follow a specific federal law 
and others resist, or for establishing the conditions under which a specific state might follow. But 
one aim of this Article is to set the theoretical framework for thinking about how further empirical 
research might tackle those questions. 
148 See Michael Esler, State Supreme Court Commitment to State Law, JUDICATURE, July–August 
1994, at 25, 31 (“[T]he general lack of historical records on the events and forces that shaped state 
constitutions creates problems for judges who wish to develop state laws.”); Mazzone, supra note 127, 
at 1061 (“State judges have largely lacked the tools to develop an independent body of state 
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increases the burdens on state courts to conduct independent analysis. At the 
end of the day, perhaps state courts are simply relieved to have the opportunity 
to crib from a learned and detailed federal opinion, even if the federal opinion 
speaks only to federal law. 
Further, because state courts are able to adjudicate matters of federal 
law,149 plaintiffs can join analogous state and federal claims in one action. A 
state judge confronting a case requiring adjudication of both federal and 
analogous state law will find it far easier to dispose of both claims on the same 
grounds than to differentiate between them, doubling time and effort. Of 
course, savvy defendants may remove a state court action containing both 
state and federal claims to federal court, or a plaintiff may file in federal court 
originally.150 But the pressures on state judges to adjudicate analogous claims 
under like standards will push federal judges in the same way: to apply federal 
standards to analogous state claims. Either way, state law gets pulled into the 
shadow of analogous federal law. 
Resource conservation may help explain a great deal of state following in 
the statutory and constitutional arenas.151 Because the Supreme Court is the 
last and official word on the scope of the U.S. Constitution and on the 
constitutionality, validity, and meaning of federal statutes, its interpretative 
decisions on matters of federal law can be perceived by states to create a 
presumption of validity for analogous state court decisions. In Bowers, for 
example, the Supreme Court concluded that because homosexual sodomy was 
not a “fundamental” right “deeply rooted” in the traditions of society, it was 
not a right subject to “heightened scrutiny” by the U.S. Constitution.152 It is 
no surprise that the Georgia Supreme Court took advantage of the ease of 
applying this line of reasoning to its state sodomy-solicitation statute under 
the Georgia Constitution.153 The Bowers opinion served up an easily traceable 
pattern stamped with the Supreme Court’s approval. To write differently—
as the dissenting Georgia justices did—would have required much more effort 
 
constitutional law.”). But see WILLIAMS, supra note 121, at 319 (contending that some “state 
constitutional history is . . . much more available than federal constitutional history”). 
149 Congress has excluded state jurisdiction in only a few areas of federal law. See, e.g., 28 
U.S.C. § 1338 (2012) (granting exclusive original jurisdiction to federal district courts over civil suits 
on patents, copyrights, and trademarks). 
150 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (permitting defendants to remove a suit from state court to 
federal court if the federal court has original jurisdiction over the suit). 
151 See generally GARDNER, supra note 115, at 50 (arguing that the costs of state constitutional 
following are low); Friedman, supra note 115, at 797 (theorizing that the costs of independent state 
constitutional interpretation may be dauntingly high). 
152 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 578 (2003). 
153 See Christiansen v. State, 468 S.E.2d 188 (Ga. 1996). 
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(as their much longer opinion suggests it did).154 The same cost-avoidance 
tendency holds true for matters of statutory law. 
This resource-conservation theory of state following might also explain some 
instances of state procedural divergence. The states that least incorporate the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are primarily large, resource-rich, independently 
minded states that can more easily absorb the cost of promulgating their own 
rule systems.155 Even for traditional followers, the cost of repeat following 
might exceed the cost of standing still if federal law changes too rapidly. This 
may explain why replica states have not kept pace with the frequent changes 
in the Federal Rules;156 it is easier for rulemakers to remain inert than to issue 
conforming amendments every year. 
B.  Vertical Uniformity 
An obvious rationale for state following is to reap the benefits of 
uniformity. At the horizontal federal level, uniformity has long played a powerful 
role in shaping federal institutional structure and jurisprudence.157 As Richard 
Fallon argues, uniform treatment, interpretation, and application of federal law 
are closely tied to notions of legal and governmental legitimacy.158 In perhaps an 
overstatement, Thomas Wall Shelton, seeking passage of a bill to provide for 
federal procedural uniformity, said, “[Uniformity is] so splendid, so beautiful 
and so beneficial in every respect, as to command unstintedly the loving labor, 
time and treasure of the best men of this marvelous age in which we live.”159 
Vertical uniformity stands on somewhat different footing. Uniformity 
within a single legal regime has a stronger case than uniformity across two 
independent regimes. Nevertheless, vertical uniformity has long been considered 
a jurisprudential virtue because it offers: (1) predictability within a particular 
 
154 See id. at 190-99 (Sears, J, dissenting and Hunstein, J, dissenting). 
155 Oakley & Coon, supra note 16, at 1426 (highlighting that states with large populations are 
“less likely to have systematically modeled their civil procedures on the Federal Rules”). 
156 Oakley, supra note 19, at 355. Still, it is noteworthy that even given the pressure to keep 
pace, Oakley found that 66% of the five selected amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
from 1980 to 1991, and more than 25% of the 1993 federal amendments, were adopted by the states 
studied. Id. at 382. 
157 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
1501, 1553 (2006) (arguing that federal law should be uniformly interpreted in state and federal courts); 
Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 BYU L. REV. 67, 83-84 
(arguing that federal courts should strive for “uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal 
law”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 
104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1812 n.451 (1991) (“[W]e do have a single federal judicial system in which 
uniformity is a prominent aspiration.”). But see generally Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 1567 (2008) (questioning the virtues of horizontal federal uniformity). 
158 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1794-96 (2005). 
159 Thomas W. Shelton, Uniformity of Judicial Procedure and Decision, LAW STUDENT’S HELPER, 
Oct. 1914, at 5, 9. 
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geographic region; (2) simplicity, clarity, and efficiency by reducing variation; 
(3) the appearance of neutrality; and (4) the enhancement of reputation by 
evincing unanimity and consistency.160 Indeed, the prevalence of “uniform” 
codes, “model” codes, and “restatements” designed to encourage uniformity 
across fifty different sovereigns is a manifestation of law’s push toward uniformity 
across independent regimes.161 
In the procedural context in particular, “uniformity enjoys virtually universal 
approval,”162 and one possible explanation for state procedural following is the 
desire to promote vertical procedural uniformity within a state. States have no 
power to change the procedure followed by federal courts in their states, and 
federal actors are unlikely to dismantle the horizontal uniformity of federal 
procedure in ways that allow federal procedure to mirror the various state 
procedures.163 So a state that considers vertical uniformity important might 
rationally seek to adopt state procedures that mimic federal procedures. 
Vertical procedural uniformity surely has its benefits.164 Attorneys practicing 
within a state need only learn one kind of procedure. The breadth of concurrent 
subject-matter jurisdiction ensures that there will be some overlap between the 
set of attorneys appearing before state courts and the set of attorneys appearing 
before federal courts in their state. It is simpler and easier for attorneys, and 
cheaper and less risky for clients, for the procedural rules among state and 
federal courts within a single state to be uniform.165 
 
160 See Main, supra note 20, at 311-12; see also Chen, supra note 45, at 1462-64 (justifying 
procedural uniformity for reasons of “[p]redictability of result,” “[c]onsistent administration of 
justice,” “[r]efinement and quality,” and “[c]ost and efficiency”). 
161 For example, most states have modeled their professional ethics rules on the American Bar 
Association’s nonbinding Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See MARGARET RAYMOND, THE 
LAW AND ETHICS OF LAW PRACTICE 11 (2009) (noting that the ABA’s goal was to create a useful 
template for jurisdictions and encourage uniformity). According to the ABA, “California is the only 
state that does not have professional conduct rules that follow the format of the ABA Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct.” Model Rules of Professional Conduct, ABA, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
mrpc/model_rules.html [http://perma.cc/V37E-HVYB] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). 
162 Main, supra note 20, at 312. 
163 Despite recognition that local rules and court discretion alloy the uniformity of federal 
procedure, see infra note 173, and despite calls for limited rethinking of the transsubstantivity of 
federal procedure, see, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the 
Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27 (1994), and despite sporadic 
instances in which federal procedure incorporates state procedural rules, see, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. 
v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001), no one advocates for a return to the era of the 
Conformity Acts, which generally required a federal court to apply the state procedure applicable 
in the state in which it sat, see Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255 § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197. 
164 See Koppel, supra note 8, at 1174 (arguing that intrastate uniformity of discovery rules is a 
desirable goal achievable through states’ willingness to follow federal procedure); Subrin, supra note 
24, at 2001 (noting that the primary goal of uniform rules should be to resolve similar cases in an 
efficient manner). 
165 See, e.g., Koppel, supra note 8, at 1194 (“Civil litigation in state and federal courts is 
increasingly national and international in scope, crossing state lines as well as national boundaries. 
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Vertical procedural uniformity also inhibits vertical forum shopping. In 
cases of concurrent subject-matter jurisdiction, either party usually can select 
to litigate in federal court.166 Although the substantive law generally will be the 
same in either forum, each forum applies its own procedure, which may induce 
forum shopping for the most favorable procedure.167 The greater the degree of 
uniformity between federal and state procedures, the less likely procedural 
rules will be the basis for vertical forum-shopping by the parties. 
The promise of these benefits offers some explanation for the state 
procedural following observed in Part I. The proliferation of state procedural 
rules mirroring the Federal Rules in the decades immediately following the 
Federal Rules’ adoption is consistent with a desire to promote intrastate 
procedural uniformity to simplify matters for the local bar and dissuade 
vertical forum shopping. These goals are also consistent with the effort of 
state courts that have followed the Supreme Court’s new pleading standards 
and with Professor Main’s finding that state courts attempt to conform state 
procedural practice to federal procedural practice, even when state rules differ 
textually from federal rules.168 
The realities of procedural uniformity also help explain some state 
divergence from the federal lead. Vertical procedural uniformity is relatively 
easy to achieve if federal procedure is static, or at least changes gradually and 
predictably; it is far more difficult to maintain, as a practical and political matter, 
if federal procedural changes are rapid, are numerous, are novel, or themselves 
erode uniformity. Federal rulemakers are active; despite the difficulty of 
 
For this reason, the aesthetic of the national procedural uniformity that produced the Federal Rules 
in 1938 is even timelier today than it was in the first third of the Twentieth Century and is applicable 
to both state and federal procedure.” (footnotes omitted)). But see Frost, supra note 157, at 1600 
(arguing that “predictability and uniformity need not go hand-in-hand” and are not necessarily 
compromised by variation in procedure). 
166 There are some exceptions, such as substantive areas of exclusive jurisdiction and areas of 
removal asymmetry. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012) (providing exclusive federal jurisdiction for 
patents); id. § 1441(b) (prohibiting a forum defendant from removing a diversity case); Ankenbrandt 
v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 701-03 (1992) (discussing states’ exclusive jurisdiction for the issuance of 
marriages and divorces). 
167 See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins., 559 U.S. 393 (2010). But cf. John 
Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 710 (1974) (“[F]orum shopping is not 
an evil per se. It is evil only if something evil flows from it . . . .”). 
168 See Main, supra note 20, at 370-71 (theorizing that intrastate procedural uniformity may 
arise despite differing rule texts because of the force of “local legal culture,” the “composite of shared 
norms, experiences, expectations and values of lawyers, judges and other institutional forces . . . 
that, while not necessarily reflected in the textual rules, nonetheless inhere in the standards that are 
applied”); see also Oakley, supra note 19, at 384 (“It may be that the role of formal rules has been 
exaggerated, and that ‘local legal culture’ is more important in determining how procedure works at 
the grass roots level, whether in a federal courtroom or a state one.”). 
2016] The Gravitational Force of Federal Law 735 
implementing dramatic rule amendments,169 the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure are amended almost every year, often in numerous ways, and some 
of the amendments represent significant innovation (such as the waiver rule for 
service under Rule 4 and the “safe harbor” provision of Rule 11).170 States are 
hard-pressed to keep up, especially if interest groups with localized lobbying 
power contest the procedural issues under consideration.171 States also may 
genuinely wish to delay adopting proposed rules for a time to see how such 
experimental rules play out, especially in today’s data-driven society. Further, 
federal amendments have tended to favor judicial discretion and flexibility, 
resulting in judge-specific and case-specific application of the rules in federal 
court.172 The widespread adoption of local rules has eroded horizontal 
uniformity on the federal level.173 As federal procedure moves away from its 
origins, and as it cultivates disuniformity even among federal cases, the states’ 
ability to mimic federal procedure flags.174 The practical difficulty of keeping 
up may help explain why, in recent years, state following at the rule level has 
subsided. Like gravity itself, the linguistic and structural closeness of 
procedural regimes within the same state exert attractive force. As the distance 
of space and time widens, the attraction abates.175 
 
169 See Mark R. Kravitz, To Revise, or Not to Revise: That Is the Question, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 
213, 216-17 (2010) (noting that amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are products of 
time-consuming research, conferences, and hearings). 
170 See, e.g., FED R. CIV. P. 4; FED R. CIV. P. 11. 
171 See Koppel, supra note 8, at 1188 (observing the localized political influence of the 
plaintiffs’ bar in state legislatures); Roger Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things to Come: The Great 
Split Between Federal and State Pleading Standards, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 113 (2010) (“Interest 
groups lobby rulemakers and legislators to create or preserve procedural advantages. The political 
successes of these interest groups further undermined national procedural uniformity.”). 
172 See generally Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561 (2003). 
173 Scholars have observed and lamented this fracturing of federal procedure. See Paul D. 
Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 937-38 (1996) 
(noting increased “erosion of the final decision requirement” in federal courts that adopt local rules); 
Koppel, supra note 8, at 1171-72 (recognizing widespread scholarly criticism of the “movement to 
location” in federal procedure); Michalski, supra note 171, at 113 (detailing the detriment caused by 
the divergence of pleading standards in state and federal courts); Subrin, supra note 24, at 2024-26 
(suggesting that the adoption of local discovery limitations by federal courts may result in disparate 
treatment of parties); Carl Tobias, A Civil Discovery Dilemma for the Arizona Supreme Court, 34 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 615, 615 (2002) (observing the accelerating number of procedural changes and growing 
inconsistency of requirements caused by “the growing balkanization of federal civil procedure”); 
Carl Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure for the Twenty-First Century, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 533, 
579 (2002) (calling on the legislature to restore “the primacy of all federal rules that govern civil, 
appellate, bankruptcy, criminal, and admiralty procedure”); see also WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 21, at 
433 (arguing that the proliferation of local rules is a “threat to uniformity throughout the country”). 
174 See Michalski, supra note 171, at 114 (observing that because uniformity is a path-dependent 
good, initial state divergence makes further divergence more likely). 
175 Cf. Oakley, supra note 19, at 355 (finding, in a 2002 survey of state procedural following in 
the wake of FRCP amendments made between 1990 and 1993, that state rulemakers were less and 
less likely to adopt state analogues to federal rule amendments). Still, it is noteworthy that even 
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For these reasons, state interest in vertical procedural uniformity likely 
plays some role in explaining both the general tendency of state actors to 
mimic federal procedures and the increasing disinclination of state 
rulemakers to follow recent federal procedural rule amendments. 
For similar reasons, the quest for vertical uniformity may help explain 
states’ tendency to follow substantive law. Statutory conformity avoids imposing 
conflicting directives for primary actors and simplifies understanding of rights 
and obligations.176 For example, Pennsylvania’s Human Relations Act contains 
a term of art—“bona fide occupational qualification,” or BFOQ—which is also 
found in Title VII.177 Pennsylvania state courts quickly decided to read the 
act’s BFOQ definition in harmony with Title VII, though that conclusion was 
not compelled by the text, explaining, “This is the only reasonable, workable 
method, through hand-in-hand working of the state and federal government, 
that will carry us to a practical interpretation of this important exception.”178 
Vertical uniformity also shows commitment to a common cause in both 
statutory and constitutional law.179 Thus, for example, in employment 
discrimination, state legislatures might choose to mimic Congress not 
because they believe the precise language of a federal statute is the best 
approach, but because mimicry enables states to claim equal footing with 
federal law. Finally, state legislatures and judges might seek substantive 
vertical uniformity in order to reduce forum shopping.180 
For these reasons, state interest in vertical uniformity likely provides 
some explanation for the gravitational force of federal law. 
C.  Familiarity and Focus 
American legal traditions historically have focused on federal law at the 
expense of state law. This skewed focus toward federal law manifests itself in 
several ways. 
First, judges and lawyers are trained in federal law.181 Outside doctrinal 
areas without federal analogues like contract law and tort law, law schools 
 
given these pressures, 66% of the 1980 to 1991 federal amendments, and more than 25% of the 1993 
federal amendments, were adopted by the states studied. Id. at 382. 
176 Long, supra note 79, at 478, 505-06. 
177 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 955; 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(e) (2012). 
178 City of Philadelphia v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 300 A.2d 91, 101 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973). 
179 Goldfarb, supra note 81, at 90 (stating that, in civil rights law, “both federal and state law 
play leading roles”). 
180 Long, supra note 79, at 505-06. 
181 Organizational sociology recognizes the normalizing force of common schooling. See 
DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 146, at 152 (“Universities and professional training institutions are 
important centers for the development of organizational norms among professional managers and 
their staff . . . . Such mechanisms create a pool of almost interchangeable individuals who occupy 
similar positions across a range of organizations and possess a similarity of orientation and 
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typically require or emphasize federal law courses. Schools require federal 
civil procedure and federal constitutional law, and offer courses in 
employment discrimination, tax, evidence, administrative law, environmental 
law, and many other areas focus on federal law.182 The multistate bar exam 
requires knowledge of federal civil procedure, federal evidence, and federal 
constitutional law,183 and more than a dozen states have adopted the Uniform 
Bar Exam to reduce or even replace the need to test state-specific law.184 
Federal judges hire students and recent graduates as interns and judicial 
clerks. Once in practice, all but the most local practices have interactions with 
federal law, and even attorneys focusing solely on state law continue to receive 
federal-law schooling through continuing legal education courses and 
interactions with federal practitioners and federal judges in their local bar 
associations.185 In short, few members of the state bench and bar are not well-
versed in the federal law analogues of state law.186 
Second, lawyers often frame claims under federal law rather than state law 
in order to take advantage of the national application of federal law. It is a 
 
disposition that may override variations in tradition and control that might otherwise shape 
organizational behavior.”). For an exploration of how this idea applies to state constitutional law, 
with a discussion of the special role of political parties, see Gardner, supra note 118, at 59-60. 
182 See, e.g., Arthur Earl Bonfield, State Law in the Teaching of Administrative Law: A Critical 
Analysis of the Status Quo, 61 TEX. L. REV. 95, 99 (1982) (“[M]ost professors of administrative law study 
only federal law, write only on federal law, and teach only federal law.”); Jennifer Friesen, Adventures in 
Federalism: Some Observations on the Overlapping Spheres of State and Federal Constitutional Law, 3 
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 25, 32 (1993) (criticizing law schools for the lack of state law education); Mazzone, 
supra note 127, at 1063 (advocating for increased recognition of the important role of state courts in 
advancing federal constitutional law); Williams, supra note 115, at 164 (“Very few courses on state 
constitutional law are offered, and the basic federal constitutional law courses do not highlight state 
constitutions.”). Bonfield blames this pedagogical focus on “a public fascination with the role of the 
national government in public law,” a “prevalent but rarely expressed assumption that federal law is 
inherently superior to state law in the administrative law area,” and law professors’ limited experiences 
practicing state law. Bonfield, supra, at 98. But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., How Much Should an 
Administrative Law Course Accomplish?: A Response to Schotland’s Five Easy Pieces, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 123, 
124 (1991) (asserting that he “learned nothing” from studying state administrative decisionmaking that 
is “generalizable” or that was “not available through study of federal agencies”). One notable exception 
is criminal law, which has strong state-law representation in law schools. 
183 See 2016 MBE Subject Matter Outline, MULTISTATE B. EXAMINATION, http://www.ncbex.org/
about-ncbe-exams/mbe/overview-of-the-mbe [http://perma.cc/LRE8-K6GL] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). 
184 See Uniform Bar Examination, NAT’L CONF. B. EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex.org/exams/ube 
[http://perma.cc/8SK8-P9V8] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). 
185 Main, supra note 20, at 374 (“Federal and state bar associations within a locality are—if not 
the same attorneys—members of the same law firms, committees and organizations; they are 
graduates of the same law schools; they attend the same continuing legal education classes; and they 
navigate through the same social circles . . . . After all, federal and state judges were likely drawn 
from the local bar and thus, may share those similarities of culture already discussed.”). 
186 Possible exceptions include state prosecutors and criminal-defense attorneys, but they must 
also contend with federal constitutional law. See U.S. CONST. amends. V-VIII (offering federal 
constitutional rights to state criminal defendants). 
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bigger, and potentially easier, win for a cause to succeed at the national level 
in one fell swoop than to have to litigate state claims in all fifty states.187 For 
example, disability-rights groups have focused on federal statutory law, to the 
marginalization of state law.188 The result of this focus is that both state and 
federal judges become more accustomed to construing controversial matters of 
federal law than state law.189 Any state law issues that arise enter a conversation 
so steeped in federal terms that lawyers and jurists tend to raise and address 
those state issues in federal terms.190 
Third, expansive doctrines of federal subject-matter jurisdiction give 
federal judges ample, at times even primary, opportunity to interpret state 
law from a federal-law focus. I have already discussed the efficiency and 
cognitive-simplicity pressures on judges to decide analogous claims similarly. 
Federal judges are particularly likely to approach analogous state claims with 
federal law in mind, and the law gives them much opportunity to do so. The 
Supreme Court’s Grable doctrine makes state claims with certain embedded 
federal issues eligible for federal-question jurisdiction.191 Supplemental 
jurisdiction gives federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over any state 
claim that is substantially related to a joined federal claim.192 And if 
plaintiffs do not file such mixed cases in federal court, defendants are likely 
to remove them to federal court.193 Siphoning state claims away from state 
courts has the additional effect of placing the primary burden of developing 
precedent for those claims on federal courts, leaving state court precedent 
underdeveloped and dependent upon federal court precedent. 
 
187 See WILLIAMS, supra note 121, at 130-31 (describing the difficulty of applying state as 
opposed to federal constitutional arguments). 
188 See Michael E. Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, 63 EMORY L.J. 527, 529 (2014) 
(“[T]oday the key tool for disability rights is litigation under federal statutes.”). 
189 Causes tend to be advanced by repeat players, and that repetition might be a non-gravitational 
factor. For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is commonly known to be a repeat litigant in many 
state and federal courts, and a repeat lobbyist before both state legislatures and Congress, and its 
message is relatively consistent. No doubt the consistency of such repeat players’ efforts results in 
pressure on lawmakers and courts to resolve issues in a similar way. Lawrence Hurley, Insight: Chamber of 
Commerce Turns to Small Courts for Big Wins, REUTERS, (Sept. 23, 2013), http://reuters.com/article/
2013/09/23/us-usa-legal-chamber-insight-idUSBRE98M04P20130923 [http://perma.cc/9CJW-DJBB]. 
190 Cf. Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme 
Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 403 (1984) (“[T]he dominance of the federal 
constitutional law point of view, and more specifically, Supreme Court decisions, in present thought 
about constitutional law. State constitutional law questions continue to be filtered almost exclusively 
through the federal constitutional law perspective.”). 
191 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
192 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012). 
193 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About 
the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 581 (1998) (explaining that 
one incentive for removal is that it defeats “plaintiffs’ forum advantage . . . [and] thereby shift[s] the biases, 
inconveniences, court quality, and procedural law in [the defendants’] own favor”). 
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Fourth, federal law gets attention because it is viewed as more prestigious. 
News agencies cover federal law. Legal academics focus on federal law, to the 
scholarly impoverishment of state law.194 State judges position themselves for 
appointment to the federal bench. State legislators run for Congress. Governors 
hope to be President. Practitioner prestige centers around big, interstate firms 
with national practices. Law students prefer federal clerkships to state clerkships. 
Today, in virtually every legal position, state-focused lawyers look to move up 
to federal-focused positions. The U.S. Constitution has achieved almost religious 
significance.195 And at the pinnacle of legal prestige is the U.S. Supreme Court, 
which commands the utmost gravitas.196 Federal law is prestigious, pervasive, 
and highly visible.197 It exhibits high expressive value.198 It is no wonder then 
that state actors are drawn to it. 
D. Political Cover 
Compared to the justices on the Supreme Court, state judges are in a 
precarious position. State court opinions can be overturned by the Supreme 
Court, by federal law, or by state law. Most state constitutions are easier to 
amend than the U.S. Constitution, and some are notoriously easier.199 These 
situations present a substantial risk that a state judge’s decision will be 
nullified or, worse, reversed as wrongly decided.200 Further, state court decisions 
 
194 See Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative 
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1105 n.228 (1981) (“[D]espite the increasing activism of 
some courts, the state judiciary remains at the periphery of the scholars’ vision.”). 
195 See Justin R. Long, Are State Constitutions Un-American? Book Review, Jeffrey M. Shaman, Equality 
and Liberty in the Golden Age of State Constitutional Law (2009), 40 RUTGERS L.J. 793, 793 (2009) (“Our 
secular scripture, the federal Constitution, retains a stranglehold on the constitutional imagination of the 
bench, bar, academy, and public.”); id. at 802-03 (describing federal ratification of “a set of symbols and 
ideas which, together, form a civic religion” of which the Constitution is the foremost relic). 
196 See WILLIAMS, supra note 121, at 185 (asserting that the Supreme Court’s interpretations of 
individual constitutional rights have an “overwhelming gravitational pull”); cf. Robert Nagel, The Role 
of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 380, 382 
(1988) (“[W]e are becoming accustomed to the idea that the direction, the emphasis, even the mood of 
Supreme Court opinions is a kind of official orthodoxy binding on everyone else in the society.”). 
197 See Goldfarb, supra note 81, at 92 (“[E]ven aside from supremacy, federal law has a degree 
of visibility and persuasiveness that state law lacks.”); see also Susan Welch & Kay Thompson, The 
Impact of Federal Incentives on State Policy Innovation, 24 AM. J. POL. SCI. 715, 718 (1980) (exploring 
“pressures placed on states to conform to . . . national policy”). 
198 See generally RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES 
AND LIMITS (2015). 
199 Cf. Mazzone, supra note 127, at 1063 (observing that state constitutions are “more likely to 
be amended in response to an adverse state court ruling”). 
200 For example, in State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1981), the Florida Supreme Court 
interpreted the Florida Constitution more liberally than the U.S. Supreme Court had interpreted the 
federal Fourth Amendment. Compare id., with United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). Florida voters 
amended the Florida Constitution to require state courts to follow the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the federal Fourth Amendment (voters also amended the Florida Constitution to require state judges to 
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on state-law matters tend to implicate state-law concerns that resonate with 
state citizens and state officials. Even if not overturned, state court decisions 
may face intense criticism from these constituencies. 
Were state judges to hold life tenure like federal judges, they might not care 
so tangibly about reactions to their decisions. But state judges do not have such 
job security. Political and institutional conditions keep them close to state 
politics.201 Most state judges are elected by state voters; others are term 
appointed and reappointed by elected state officials.202 From a career standpoint, 
state judges may care very deeply about how their decisions are perceived. State 
judges have been voted off the bench because of the opinions they signed.203 
Political and public backlash, then, is a real concern for many state judges.204 
Following federal law and federal courts offers some cover against potential 
backlash.205 Deciding an issue in tune with federal law allows state courts to 
shift responsibility to federal law or the U.S. Supreme Court.206 State law decisions 
that deviate from federal law are more likely to be overruled than those that 
conform to federal law.207 Part of the reason may be the belief among state courts 
that the Supreme Court’s decision on an important or policy-laden matter of 
 
follow Supreme Court federal Eighth Amendment precedent). See Marks, supra note 122, at 703-04, 711-
12. California has experienced similar events. See Mazzone, supra note 127, at 1055. 
201 See David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 267-68 (2008). 
202 Id. 
203 See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 737 n.144 (1995) (documenting the 1986 defeat of Chief Justice Rose Bird 
and two associate justices of the California Supreme Court in a retention election for setting aside 
death penalties); A. G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/5QPA-
JWJK] (recounting the story of three Iowa justices voted off the bench in reaction to their decision 
allowing same-sex marriage). 
204 See Mazzone, supra note 127, at 1051-53. It can be difficult to predict when voter or political 
backlash against judicial opinions might occur. See SHAMAN, supra note 123, at 252 (noting the 
absence of voter backlash to state constitutional interpretations expanding abortion and same-sex 
rights in some states). All the more reason for the risk-adverse state judge to seek political cover 
whenever possible. 
205 See Wayne A. Logan, A House Divided: When State and Lower Federal Courts Disagree on 
Federal Constitutional Rights, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 247 (2014) (“Adopting a right-restrictive 
position might also be seen [by state judges] as the ‘safest’ position . . . .”); Mazzone, supra note 127, 
at 1053-54. 
206 If state courts decide an issue without making clear that the opinion is based on state law, 
the Supreme Court will have appellate jurisdiction to review it as if the opinion were based on 
federal law. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (“[W]hen the adequacy and independence 
of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most 
reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that 
federal law required it to do so.”). State courts thus must walk a fine line between blame shifting 
and opening themselves up to the threat of Supreme Court reversal. However, the Supreme Court’s 
limited docket makes reversal highly unlikely, and, even if reversal occurs, the state court still escapes 
blame for the substantive result. 
207 See Williams, supra note 190, at 357. 
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federal law can reflect public sentiment in a way that gives state courts 
confronted with a similar issue comfort that their analogous resolution of state 
law will be politically safe. This explanation is especially powerful if the 
national sentiments reflected in the Supreme Court’s opinion are mirrored in 
the particular state in which the state court sits. 
Another part of the reason may be the political cost of rejecting the 
Supreme Court’s view. In other words, even when the Supreme Court does 
not reflect public opinion—or at least the public opinion of a particular state 
court’s state—the Supreme Court commands a level of gravitas that seems to 
generate an expectation of following absent compelling reasons for deviation. 
If a dropped rock falls to the ground, one needs no explanation, but if it defies 
gravity, one wonders what the hell is going on. Similarly, it is far easier for a 
state judge to tell voters that her opinion follows the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court than to try to explain why she diverged.208 
These explanations seem to fit particularly well in certain matters of 
constitutional and statutory law. Recall the story of gay rights and Bowers v. 
Hardwick told in Part I.209 Following Bowers—a rights-restrictive decision 
holding a state statute criminalizing consensual, private, adult sodomy valid 
under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution210—many state courts 
interpreted their state constitutions accordingly.211 Indeed, despite its 
nonpreemptive and narrow holding,212 Bowers was a major factor in the 
stagnation of gay rights over the next ten years.213 In 1996, Congress passed, 
and President Bill Clinton signed, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 
which defined marriage for purposes of federal law as between one man and 
one woman and allowed states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages 
validated elsewhere.214 Immediately following the federal government’s lead, 
 
208 This idea is roughly analogous to the theory in organizational sociology that isomorphism 
generates legitimacy for and enhances the reputation of the copier. See, e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, supra 
note 146, at 151-52 (theorizing that organizational isomorphism is a cheap way to gain legitimacy); Mark 
C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 
593-94 (1995) (arguing that imitation failures can decrease organizational legitimacy). For foundational 
work on organizational legitimacy, see generally TALCOTT PARSONS, STRUCTURE AND PROCESS IN 
MODERN SOCIETIES (1960); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus 
Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1978). 
209 See supra subsection I.B.2. 
210 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
211 For my earlier discussion of Bowers, see supra text accompanying notes 130–40. 
212 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 (noting that the case does not require a judgment about whether a 
state court may invalidate similar laws on state law grounds). 
213 See, e.g., Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“After Hardwick 
it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.”). 
214 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 
(1996)), invalidated in part by United States v. Windsor, 113 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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most states enacted mini-DOMAs restricting marriage under state law to 
opposite-sex couples.215 
States that diverged by expanding gay rights under state law tended to be 
quickly reined in,216 and, until very recently, significant popular backlash, 
both generalized and targeted, to state advances of gay rights was a real 
threat.217 For example, in a widely reported retention election, three justices 
of the Iowa Supreme Court were voted down for retention primarily on the 
basis of an opinion they joined that required Iowa to recognize same-sex 
marriage. This was the first time an Iowa Supreme Court justice had ever 
been rejected for retention.218 
It was not until the Supreme Court decided United States v. Windsor,219 
holding the federal Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional under the Fifth 
Amendment, that states felt protected enough to begin advancing gay-marriage 
equality with vigor.220 Windsor, of course, was purely an interpretation of 
federal law and went out of its way to note the federalism underpinnings that 
give states different prerogatives on defining marriage.221 Yet even when not 
controlling, Supreme Court decisions offer states political cover. The Supreme 
Court of New Mexico, for example, relied on Windsor (and Romer, Lawrence, 
and Loving222) in construing its own state constitution to guarantee marriage 
 
215 See Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 26, 2015), http://www.
ncsl.org/research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx [http://perma.cc/BP97-NS3Q] (noting 
that before October 6, 2014, thirty-one states had statutory or constitutional provisions that defined 
marriage as between a man and a woman). 
216 See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (holding restrictions on gay marriage 
presumptively unconstitutional under the Hawaii constitution), superseded by HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 
(abrogated 2015). Exceptions include Goodridge v. Massachusetts Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 
941 (Mass. 2003), and Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999), which are decisions from liberal states 
whose polls showed meaningful support for gay marriage. See Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and 
Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 1493, 1501, 1529 (2006) (explaining that support for same-sex marriage in Massachusetts 
and Vermont was greater than in the rest of the country). But even Massachusetts felt political backlash. 
See id. at 1500-01 (describing the response of social conservatives in the federal government and the 
Massachusetts state government as “immediate and forceful”). The Massachusetts court in Goodridge, 
perhaps anticipating that backlash, relied heavily on whatever support it could find from the Supreme 
Court in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), even though 
those decisions did not, on their face, speak to state-law recognition of gay marriage. Goodridge, 798 
N.E.2d at 948, 953, 958-59, 961-62. 
217 See Ball, supra note 216, at 1500-05, 1511-16, 1523; Franklin, supra note 140, at 844-45. For a 
seminal study of backlash, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004). 
218 Sulzberger, supra note 203. 
219 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
220 See Same-Sex Marriage Laws, supra note 215. 
221 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691-92, 2696. 
222 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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equality.223 Those Supreme Court cases did not demand the result the state 
court reached—indeed, they expressly disavowed any implications for it—but, 
as high-profile Supreme Court decisions, they no doubt gave the state court 
more security in reaching it. 
The same scenario plays out in matters of statutory law that focus on 
sensitive policy issues. As one commentator has argued, 
Simply stated, a state judge, despite having the inherent authority to 
construe a state statute in a manner inconsistent with federal law, may 
hesitate to announce to the world that a majority of the country’s 
highest court got the issue wrong, either because the judge wants to 
avoid charges of judicial activism or out of respect for the reputation 
of the Supreme Court.224 
Procedure cases offer a counterpoint. Much of procedure is apolitical.225 
Procedural choices often escape the attention of the lay public—and often of 
legislators. Rulemakers have, at least until very recently, been insulated from 
the kind of politics that dominate legislation.226 States were procedural leaders 
for centuries before the adoption of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
so political cover is not a strong impetus for state following of federal 
procedure.227 Of course, where federal procedure takes a decidedly 
provocative turn, such as through the revolutionary changes of 1938 or the 
widely maligned Twombly and Iqbal decisions, acceptance of those federal 
changes can offer political cover for states that follow them.228 Political cover 
may thus offer some explanatory value for the following of replica states or 
those that have adopted Twombly and Iqbal. 
In the run-of-the-mill procedure choices, however, there is far less 
political effect. Federal procedural law has no preemptive effect, and the 
Supreme Court cannot reverse a state court on an issue of state procedural 
 
223 See Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 870-72, 883-86 (N.M. 2013). 
224 Long, supra note 79, at 479. 
225 I mean this relatively. Politics can influence procedure but usually less frequently and less 
strongly than substantive law. 
226 See Richard Marcus, Procedural Polarization in America? (“One activity that might escape 
[political polarization] is the process of making procedure rules. In the U.S. federal courts, that 
process has been somewhat insulated from political pressures, and that insulation has largely been 
respected in recent decades.”), in 18 ZZPINT: ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ZIVILPROZESS INTERNATIONAL: 
JAHRBUCH DES INTERNATIONALEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS 303, 303 (2013). 
227 See id. at 304 (explaining that until the adoption of the federal rules Congress directed 
those courts to follow the procedure used by the states in which they sat). 
228 This may help explain Oakley and Coon’s findings that replica states tend to be less populous, 
while the most divergent states tend to be larger and more populous. See Oakley & Coon, supra note 
16, at 1426. Legislators of big states, because of geographic dispersion and voter dilution, are less 
accountable to any particular faction and thus have greater political freedom to diverge. 
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law.229 Procedural choices do not often generate front-page news.230 I thus 
infer only weak explanatory power of political cover for the gravitational pull 
of federal procedure on states. 
E.  Force of Habit 
A final explanation for state following is behavioral path dependence.231 
In essence, following becomes a habit; following for a while makes following 
easier and more acceptable. 
The history of state following is long. It is no surprise that state law, courts, 
and practice have always looked roughly the same (certainly compared to other 
countries). The common-law tradition in particular, in which states have been 
steeped for centuries, looks to build by horizontal following.232 The famous 1928 
“proximate cause” opinion Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad,233 for example, has 
been followed by nearly every state.234 In procedural circles, the New York Field 
Code, adopted in 1848, quickly became the model for most states.235 
The late 1930s marked a new era of following: vertical following. For the 
first time, federal courts had an independent, comprehensive, and uniform 
procedure. Federal statutory law exploded.236 And the Supreme Court mounted 
a robust campaign of expanding federal regulatory power and federal constitutional 
rights, shutting out and constraining the states. On all fronts, federal law was 
flexing its muscles. These historical efforts shifted the balance of power and 
preeminence to the federal government and, particularly, to the Supreme 
Court. Federal law became the new leader.237 
 
229 See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) (“Since the procedural rules of its 
courts are surely matters on which a State is competent to legislate, it follows that a State may apply 
its own procedural rules to actions litigated in its courts.”). 
230 See Marcus, supra note 226, at 303. 
231 For a sample of studies of behavioral path dependence in organizational sociology, see 
generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE (1990); Jörg Sydow & Jochen Koch, Organizational Path Dependence: Opening the 
Black Box, 34 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 689 (2009). 
232 Williams, supra note 115, at 152. 
233 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
234 See W. Jonathan Cardi, The Hidden Legacy of Palsgraf: Modern Duty Law in Microcosm, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 1873, 1890 (2011). 
235 Subrin, supra note 12, at 939. 
236 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 42-44 (1991). 
237 That is not to say that federal law always leads. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52 (1961) 
(incorporating the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary remedy against the states based in part on a 
recognition that the California Supreme Court had adopted the exclusionary rule and deemed it to have 
been highly successful); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-17 (2002) (surveying states to 
determine when a right has been deemed so “fundamental” as to be protected under the federal Due 
Process Clause); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (surveying states to determine when a 
punishment is so “cruel and unusual” as to be prohibited by the Eighth Amendment). 
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As part of this shift, the states found themselves with very little room to 
diverge from the advancement of federal substantive law. Under the Supremacy 
Clause, the Court’s aggressive expansion of federal law and federal rights was 
binding on the states, such that the states had little more to do other than to 
rotely follow the Supreme Court.238 This era inculcated a culture of following 
that led to the atrophy of the motivation of states to use state law independently.239 
In the 1970s, the Burger Court began scaling back federal power and 
progressives like William Brennan turned to the states to urge independent 
enforcement of rights.240 Yet after more than thirty years, the states were not 
used to developing state law independently.241 As a result, “[t]he degree to 
which state courts have answered the call to action remains debatable” and 
seems, even today, to be characterized by default state following with pockets 
of exceptions.242 
The force of habit may help explain why some states blindly followed the 
procedural decisions of Twombly and Iqbal. After 1938, when federal procedure 
came to the fore, state rulemakers followed the Federal Rules, and state courts 
followed the Supreme Court’s Conley decision for decades.243 The Supreme 
Court’s shifts in Twombly and Iqbal were just new bends in a long-traveled 
road. Old habits can be hard to break. 
Yet there is some evidence that those habits are cracking in certain places. 
Some state courts have resisted Twombly and Iqbal.244 State rulemakers are less 
and less likely to adopt federal rule amendments.245 States break more readily 
from constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court. It is unclear whether the 
gravitational pull of federal law is weakening or the willingness of states to 
resist is strengthening. For whatever reason, another watershed moment 
looms on the horizon: an opportunity to consider more fully the implications 
of state following, with the potential for meaningful implementation. It is to 
that question I now turn. 
 
238 See Mazzone, supra note 127, at 1061 (“[A] legacy of historical trends . . . . has turned state 
judges into expert and busy administrators of the Federal Constitution.”). 
239 See Brennan, supra note 115, at 495 (“I suppose it was only natural that when during the 
1960s our rights and liberties were in the process of becoming increasingly federalized, state courts 
saw no reason to consider what protections, if any, were secured by state constitutions.”). See generally 
Howard, supra note 119 (providing an overview of state activity on a number of rights). 
240 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State 
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986). A good summary 
of this history is provided in Blocher, supra note 119, at 335-37. 
241 See generally Howard, supra note 119. 
242 Blocher, supra note 119, at 338. 
243 See supra subsection I.A.2.a. 
244 See supra note 56. 
245 See, e.g., Oakley, supra note 19, at 355. 
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III. NORMATIVE CONCERNS 
This Part sketches some normative downsides of federal law’s gravitational 
force, including its effects on interstate variation and fidelity to state law, 
sovereign reputation, and cyclical entrenchment. I do not mean to say that 
these downsides will or should always carry the day. Rather, I only identify 
them as necessary considerations in any normative debate about the gravitational 
force of federal law. 
A. Interstate Variation and Fidelity to State Law 
Whatever the virtues of vertical uniformity, they come at the expense of the 
countervailing virtues of variation, a system benefit.246 States are, in Brandeis’s 
words, laboratories of experimentation,247 allowing a small part of the nation to 
experiment—risking potential failure for the accumulation of knowledge and 
the possible rewards of success—without damaging the whole. Unsure whether 
heightened pleading imposes too high of a hurdle for certain plaintiffs? A state 
can test it first. Think that society will be improved with greater abortion rights 
than federal law currently mandates? A state can try it out. Believe in expanded 
rights for disabled workers? A state can offer them. For those who find 
heterogeneity stimulating and beautiful, variation is its own reward. For those 
convinced by the virtues of homogeneity, allowing temporary, controlled, and 
collaborative variation may help achieve uniformity in a better form.248 
Acceding to federal law’s gravitational pull gives up on these system 
benefits. Federal law is nationally uniform. If each state pursues intrastate 
uniformity by following federal law, then state law will mimic federal law in 
all states, stagnating experimentation and evolution at both the intra- and 
interstate levels. 
Variation also enhances fidelity to state law, akin to what Richard Fallon 
calls “legal legitimacy.”249 Because individual states are unrepresentative of 
 
246 See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 75-106 (1995) (arguing that some 
state autonomy in policymaking results in economic, political, and social benefits); Vicki C. Jackson, 
Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2213-15 
(1998) (describing the benefits of federalism as identified in scholarly literature on constitutional 
federalism and new jurisprudence). 
247 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[A] 
single courageous State may . . . serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
248 See Koppel, supra note 8, at 1176 (“I propose that state judicial systems continue to develop 
their independent rulemaking capabilities, but not by competing with each other. Rather than competing 
as laboratories, I propose that states cooperate as laboratories through a mechanism of controlled 
experimentation designed to inform a collaborative rulemaking process leading to a model code of 
state civil procedure.”). 
249 Fallon, supra note 158, at 1794-96. 
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the nation as a whole, state following of federal law may lead to disconnects 
between state policies, state law, and state judicial interpretation. 
In substantive areas, the lawmaking stage is meant to create state laws that 
reflect the peculiar policies and preferences of the state electorate. Blind state 
following may cause state law to map poorly onto those policies and preferences, 
to the ultimate detriment of that segment of the nation. This is particularly 
true for constitutional law, which embodies the most important and fundamental 
values of a polity. At the interpretative stage, state courts eager to track 
nonpreemptive federal law may misinterpret state law, resulting in further 
distance between the preferences of state citizens and the laws that govern 
them. The California courts’ difficulty resisting the impulse to treat state 
disability law differently from federal disability law is just one example.250 The 
drift of state law away from its popular or legislative moorings erodes the legal 
legitimacy of the state law-speaking institutions. 
Procedural law is no different. State dockets differ from federal dockets in 
both the number and the type of cases.251 State courts often have fewer resources 
in terms of technology, judicial clerks, magistrate judges, or other support 
personnel. Differences in structures, resources, and policy goals may demand 
different procedures.252 Inattention to these differences can lead to state procedural 
rules that are inapt or costly for the local bench and bar. The gravitational 
force of federal law risks pulling state law in directions it ought not go. 
It may well be that vertical uniformity is, on balance, worth pursuing for 
certain states in certain areas of the law. Vertical uniformity may be especially 
warranted when social mores within a particular state reflect with specificity 
the social mores of the nation, and when the state legislature, in responding to 
the state citizenry’s preferences, enacts laws that mimic federal laws. It may 
even be warranted as an independent interpretive tool when its values are 
overwhelmingly beneficial. But states ought not overpraise it uncritically or 
demand rote adherence to it. Instead, when a state considers whether to follow 
 
250 See supra text accompanying notes 101–05. 
251 See, e.g., Roger Michalski & Abby K. Wood, Twombly and Iqbal at the State Level 4 (USC Law 
Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 14-30, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2468864 
[http://perma.cc/4QZ8-7V88] (“Litigants in state courts tend to litigate smaller claims, have fewer 
litigation and pre-suit investigative resources available to them, and conclude cases more quickly 
than litigants in federal courts. State judges, similarly, typically face higher caseloads than their 
federal counterparts and frequently are democratically accountable.”). 
252 See, e.g., Koppel, supra note 8, at 1187-88 (describing arguments against using federal 
procedures in state courts); Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a 
Sound Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 83 (1997) (noting that 
uniformity “may not make sense” on account of the federal courts’ caseload and access to resources); 
see also Subrin, supra note 16, at 1650 (discussing the motivations behind the evolution of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure). 
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federal law, the justifications for uniformity should be judged on a case-by-case 
basis and contrasted with the competing benefits of variation. 
B.  Sovereign Reputation 
The Supreme Court has insisted that states exist in the federalist system 
as quasi-independent sovereigns, not as mere dependencies or appendages of 
the federal government.253 But the Court’s own gravitational force undermines 
this view. When states follow federal law without independent consideration 
of state structures and values, they risk appearing to be secondary afterthoughts 
of the federal government rather than intellectual equals.254 The parity debate 
that Burt Neuborne began decades ago persists,255 and, though that debate’s 
focus on state competence to enforce controlling federal law is orthogonal to 
my thesis, uncritical state following of noncontrolling federal law lends credence 
to the position that states are just not as good at being sovereign as the federal 
government is.256 States risk being seen as simple-minded dependents of their 
smarter older sibling.257 
Such a reputational hit would implicate a number of federalism doctrines 
that depend upon the assumption that states are equally competent to create 
and interpret their law independently and competently. For example, in the 
abstention case of Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.,258 the Court adopted a 
policy of avoiding federal constitutional questions when a state might resolve a 
 
253 See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002) (“States, upon 
ratification of the Constitution, did not consent to become mere appendages of the Federal 
Government. Rather, they entered the Union with their sovereignty intact.”). 
254 See Dodson, supra note 10, at 17. 
255 See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (arguing that the 
assumption of parity between state and federal courts is false). See generally MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & 
JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 
(1999); Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
605 (1981); Burt Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 725 (1981); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State 
Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983). Of course, rote state 
following of controlling federal law could be seen as consistent with the core parity argument that states 
are faithful appliers and enforcers of federal law. 
256 This concern is related to, though not identical to, Richard Fallon’s idea of “sociological legitimacy,” 
or public acceptance of a law pronouncement. Fallon, supra note 158, at 1794-96. For attempts to quantify the 
legitimacy of the Supreme Court and its opinions, see generally Dion Farganis, Do Reasons Matter? The Impact 
of Opinion Content on Supreme Court Legitimacy, 65 POL. RES. Q. 206 (2012), and James L. Gibson et al., 
Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354 (2003). 
257 Cf. Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants: “Inferior” Judges and the Task of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV. 843, 845 (1993) (making an analogous point regarding 
lower federal courts in relation to the Supreme Court). 
258 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
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dispute on state-law grounds, in part because of “scrupulous regard for the 
rightful independence of the state governments.”259 The Court explained: 
The law of Texas appears to furnish easy and ample means for 
determining the Commission’s authority . . . . In the absence of any 
showing that these obvious methods for securing a definitive ruling in 
the state courts cannot be pursued with full protection of the 
constitutional claim, the district court should exercise its wise discretion 
by staying its hands.260 
Similarly, in Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,261 the Supreme Court resisted intruding 
on intricate matters of state law because the state of Texas had established a 
comprehensive and effective regulatory regime.262 The Court stated: 
The State provides a unified method for the formation of policy and 
determination of cases by the Commission and by the state courts. 
The judicial review of the Commission’s decisions in the state courts 
is expeditious and adequate. Conflicts in the interpretation of state 
law, dangerous to the success of state policies, are almost certain to 
result from the intervention of the lower federal courts . . . . Under 
such circumstances, a sound respect for the independence of state 
action requires the federal equity court to stay its hand.263 
And in Ankenbrandt v. Richards,264 the Court interpreted the federal 
diversity-jurisdiction statute to exempt certain domestic-relations issues from 
federal jurisdiction, in part because “state courts are more eminently suited 
to work of this type than are federal courts” and “because of the special 
proficiency developed by state tribunals over the past century and a half in 
handling [those] issues.”265 In other cases declining federal jurisdiction, 
the Court relies on the same assumption.266 
 
259 Id. at 501. 
260 Id. 
261 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
262 Id. at 320-32. 
263 Id. at 333-34; see also id. at 332 (“These questions of regulation of the industry by the State 
administrative agency . . . so clearly involve[] basic problems of Texas policy that equitable discretion 
should be exercised to give the Texas courts the first opportunity to consider them.”). 
264 504 U.S. 689 (1992). 
265 Id. at 704. 
266 See, e.g., Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Thomson, 318 U.S. 675 (1943) (declining equity 
jurisdiction to aid a railroad that has an adequate state remedy); Beal v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Corp., 312 
U.S. 45 (1941) (refusing to grant a federal injunction of a state criminal statute in the absence of 
irreparable injury to the plaintiff); Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 573 (1939) (“The 
guiding principle is that the federal court should proceed . . . without needlessly interfering with 
the determination of the plaintiff ’s rights in the state court.”). 
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Relatedly, the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction generally allows, for 
practical and efficiency reasons, a federal court hearing one claim over which it 
has original jurisdiction to hear related nondiverse state claims that otherwise 
would be relegated to state court.267 Underscoring the assumption that state 
courts are more competent to adjudicate matters of state law, however, the 
supplemental-jurisdiction statute gives federal courts the discretion to decline to 
hear supplemental state claims.268 In practice, federal courts routinely decline 
to hear supplemental state claims when no original-jurisdiction claims remain 
on the ground that state courts are equally competent as—if not more 
competent than—federal courts at resolving issues of state law.269 
Another effect implicates the Court’s longstanding refusal to accept issues of 
state law on appeal from state courts. In Murdock v. Memphis, the Court wrote: 
The State courts are the appropriate tribunals, as this court has repeatedly 
held, for the decision of questions arising under their local law, whether 
statutory or otherwise. And it is not lightly to be presumed that Congress 
acted upon a principle which implies a distrust of their integrity or of their 
ability to construe those laws correctly.270 
On a larger scale, state sovereign competence underlies the very idea of a 
limited national government that leaves most regulation to state governments.271 
It is in large part because the states are deemed to be capable of “perform[ing] 
many of the vital functions of modern government”272 that even within areas 
of concurrent federal and state power, the assumption has always been that 
locally accountable state governments should create and administer the laws—
i.e., state law—that most concern the lives and liberties of their citizens.273 Faith 
 
267 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012). 
268 See id. § 1367(c). 
269 See, e.g., Horne v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 969 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 2013) 
(declining jurisdiction over state law claims when state courts are “equally competent and more 
familiar with the governing law”). As the seminal case on then-called “pendent” jurisdiction 
reasoned, “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to 
promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” 
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 
270 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 626 (1874). 
271 See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (limiting the reach of federal 
authority under the Commerce Clause for activity deemed a classic use of a state’s police power); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (limiting the reach of federal authority under the 
Commerce Clause in a case involving general police powers normally retained by the states). 
272 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012). 
273 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 289 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting 
that the powers delegated to the federal government will be exercised primarily on external objects, 
while those delegated to the states will extend to the objects concerning the lives, liberties, and 
property of the people of the state). 
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in state governance has justified the presumption against federal preemption, 
leaving space for states to regulate effectively.274 
Each of these examples depends upon state competence to create, interpret, 
and adjudicate state law faithfully and autonomously as an independent sovereign. 
Our dual federalism depends upon some level of sovereign parity; without it, the 
nation is susceptible to deficiency and imbalance.275 The gravitational force of 
federal law threatens that parity by undermining state sovereign reputation. 
To be clear, some state parallelism preserves sovereign reputation. If a state 
court interpreting state law follows federal law or federal reasoning because 
it is consistent with state-codified law and policy, then the state court fulfills the 
sovereign judicial function of using independent judgment to reach a conclusion 
that just happened to mirror a different court’s.276 But slavishly following 
nonpreemptive federal law without considering state variables degrades both state 
law and state courts. 
Of course, a divergent interpretation could undermine sovereign reputation 
if seemingly inconsistent interpretations lead the public to conclude that one 
(or each) sovereign is unprincipled or incompetent, or that the law is unjustly 
indeterminate.277 I recognize this issue, but in a dual-sovereign system in 
which sovereigns are fully permitted to adopt inconsistent legal paradigms,278 
the conclusion that state divergence from federal law must be the product of 
incompetency or illegitimacy can only be premised on the very gravitational 
pull identified in Part I. 
C.  Cyclical Entrenchment 
Following breeds following beyond mere habit. Just as a black hole attracts 
more mass, making its gravitational pull ever stronger, following’s effects 
inculcate institutional norms that then compound the lure of following. 
 
274 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“[B]ecause the States are independent 
sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt 
state-law causes of action.”). 
275 Cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991) (explaining that the Framers 
contemplated “a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government”). 
276 See Dodson, supra note 10. 
277 Cf. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court 
Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (1994) (stating in the context of intra-federal inconsistencies 
that “divergent judicial interpretations seem both irrational and unfair”). For a possible example, see 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4), 119 Stat. 5 (2005) (justifying expanded 
federal jurisdiction over class actions on the ground that state courts hearing class actions are 
“sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias against out-of-State defendants”). 
278 See Ely, supra note 167, at 710 (arguing that “forum shopping is not an evil per se”); Lawrence 
Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 
1249-51 (1978) (describing examples of inconsistent legal paradigms between state and federal 
governments and highlighting how such diversity is “often consider[ed] . . . a virtue”). 
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If states routinely mimic federal law rather than innovate, then all eyes 
will train on the federal leader. Lawyers and judges will focus on and familiarize 
themselves with federal law. Law schools will teach, and bar exams will test, 
federal law at the expense of state law. Federal actors will command more 
prestige. Federal-law arguments will dominate state-law development. These 
effects—the very explanatory vectors discussed above—create a feedback loop 
in which the results of state following cycle back to strengthen federal law’s 
gravitational effect. 
The cycle is not unbreakable, and there may be enough inherent faith in 
states that the cycle merely perpetuates an imbalanced equilibrium rather 
than spiraling uncontrollably. But appreciating the feedback effect helps 
explain both the present state of the primacy of federal law and the difficulty 
of freeing state autonomy from its clutches. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article tells a story of federal law’s gravitational force on the states. 
I make the case that a gravitational force operates across the law, including 
procedural law, statutory law, constitutional law, and interpretations of each. 
State actors of all stripes—from rulemakers to legislators to judges—feel the 
gravitational pull. I offer some theoretical explanations for why states might 
follow federal leads, including practical and political reasons. And I offer 
some normative commentary on the effects of federal law’s gravitational force 
on state sovereign reputation and efficacy. 
My aim is primarily to urge greater introspection and transparency. I mean 
to empower, not disparage. State legislators and judges can be strong leaders in 
matters of analogous state and federal law. They should do more to assert and 
demonstrate that leadership. Exercising independence and leadership does not 
mean always diverging. Perhaps independent and sound judgment will dictate 
state results that mirror federal results, and, even if not, perhaps the cost savings 
of state mimicry more than offset the costs of infidelity to state law. Here, 
reasoning matters more than results. And when states feel compelled to mimic, 
they should not forget their long tradition of horizontal borrowing; sister-state 
law may have just as much to say as federal law. 
To federal lawmakers and judges, I urge sensitivity to their own gravitational 
power. Congress, in the first instance, should respect both the primacy of the 
states and the ways in which even nonpreemptive federal statutes inhibit state 
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innovation.279 The Court, for its part, can send signals in many ways,280 and 
one way is by expressly reminding states of their independence in nonpreemptive 
matters.281 Another way is by undercutting the hegemony of federal leadership. 
The modern Court has, in rare instances, taken cues from state developments, 
and it has sporadically looked to foreign precedents and norms. A culture of 
leadership breeds followers; alloying that leadership with instances of following 
may spawn a more inclusive and instructive conversation. 
This methodological approach of the descriptive portion of this Article 
has been primarily anecdotal, and no doubt others will point to counterexamples 
illustrating state independence and resistance. To reiterate, my claim is that 
a gravitational force exists, not that it is inexorable. Nor do I claim that the 
gravitational force is uniform for all states, over time, among various actors, 
or across subject-matter areas. To the contrary, it seems highly likely that a 
complicated set of conditions informs the strength of the gravitational force. 
That does not undermine my thesis, but it does mean that much more work 
needs to be done. My hope is that this Article provokes commentators to 
excavate other examples of state following or state resistance. Only with a 
more detailed record of when states follow and when they diverge can we 
better appreciate and understand the full scope and effect of the gravitational 
force of federal law. 
 
 
279 Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577-78 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (reminding 
Congress of its “grave constitutional obligation” to maintain the balance between federal and state power). 
280 See Richard M. Re, Supreme Court Signals, RE’S JUDICATA (Nov. 11, 2014, 8:28 AM) 
https://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2014/11/11/supreme-court-signals [http://perma.cc/N6K5-
8F86] (discussing the “Supreme Court’s ability to send non-precedential signals to lower courts”). 
281 The spectre of preemption can undermine even such express reminders. See Franklin, supra 
note 140, at 871-72 & 871 n.248 (arguing that Windsor, despite emphasizing the states’ presumed 
authority in matters of marriage, could be read to compel marriage equality for the states). 
